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AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND 
THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
 
Jonathan R. Nash† 
Rafael I. Pardo‡ 
 
Commentators have theorized that several factors may improve the process, and thus 
perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review: (1) review by a panel of judges, (2) subject-
matter expertise in the area of the appeal, (3) other lawfinding ability, (4) adherence to 
traditional notions of appellate hierarchy, and (5) the judicial independence of appellate 
judges. The considerable discussion that has expounded upon these theories has occurred 
in a vacuum of abstract generalization. This Article adds a new dimension by presenting 
the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy appellate opinions issued over a three-
year period. The federal bankruptcy appellate structure provides certain litigants the 
choice to appeal, in the first instance, to one of two distinct appellate tribunals—district 
courts and bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs)—whose structural features relating to the 
theorized qualities of appellate review differ. As BAPs appear to have more of the 
features identified as improving the quality of appellate review, the study tests the theory 
through various hypotheses that focus on the perception held by other federal courts 
within the bankruptcy appellate structure of the quality of appellate review provided by 
these distinct appellate tribunals. The data show that, as measured by (1) the subsequent 
disposition rendered by courts of appeals and (2) the citation practices of other federal 
courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district courts, BAPs have been 
perceived to provide a better quality of appellate review. Having unearthed some 
evidence that supports the theoretical notions underlying the quality of appellate review, 
this Article concludes that commentators and policymakers ought to be encouraged to 
explore further, in a more detailed manner, the question of how appellate structure can 
be designed to produce better results.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
What is the ideal structure for appellate review? Without providing a definitive 
answer to the question, commentators have suggested several factors that may improve 
the process, and thus perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review. First, it is said that panels 
of judges are preferable to review by a single judge. Second, expertise in the relevant area 
of law is a benefit. Third, other indicia of lawfinding ability—such as the ability of 
lawyers and judges to focus on legal issues without the distraction of factual conflicts and 
the amenability of judges’ schedules to contemplation and reflection—contribute to the 
quality of appellate review. A fourth factor is whether the court adheres to traditional 
notions of appellate hierarchy, for example following earlier precedents of that court. 
Finally, it is said that the independence of the appellate judges—that is, the extent to 
which job features such as life tenure and a guaranteed salary tend to insulate judges from 
pressures to decide cases or issues one way or another—is of value.  
In this Article, we endeavor to evaluate empirically the relative quality of 
appellate review. To do this, we rely upon data obtained from the appellate review of 
bankruptcy matters. The current federal bankruptcy appellate structure provides an 
excellent setting in which to study appellate review since it offers litigants two paths for 
obtaining appellate review. First, after the bankruptcy judge issues a ruling, litigants may 
have the district court—in the person of a single district judge—review that ruling. 
Alternatively, the parties may agree (in circuits that have them) to have the bankruptcy 
judge’s ruling reviewed by a panel of bankruptcy judges—a so-called “bankruptcy 
appellate panel” or “BAP.” Further appeal in both cases—whether from the district court 
or the bankruptcy appellate panel—lies with the proper federal circuit court of appeals.  
We collected data on affirmance rates in and citation rates to appellate bankruptcy 
opinions. Analyses of the data generally—and analyses of the citation data in particular—
support the notion that BAP decisions in our study are perceived to be of greater quality 
than are district court decisions. First, we find some support for the proposition that 
courts of appeals are more likely to uphold upon review the conclusions of BAPs than 
district courts. Second, BAP decisions are, with statistical significance, cited more 
frequently than are district court decisions by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, federal courts of 
appeals, and courts in other circuits. Only district courts are not more likely to cite BAP 
decisions than decisions rendered by district courts. 
Our findings will be of interest both to theoreticians and policymakers. If courts 
try to reach “correct” decisions, then our findings generally buttress the various theories 
about how to structure appellate tribunals so as to maximize the quality of appellate 
review. This, in turn, should guide policymakers in designing appellate tribunals and 
appellate structures in general. In particular, multimember tribunals that adhere to 
traditional notions of appellate hierarchy and that have subject-matter expertise in the 
area of the appeal appear to be desirable. And even if judges do not strive to resolve 
issues and cases “correctly,” our findings still seem to support the notion that judges 
perceive that appellate tribunals that have certain attributes will reach correct 
4 
conclusions. In this sense, our findings show the persuasive strength of the theoreticians’ 
story, or at least judges’ perceptions of the strength of that story. 
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides an overview of the 
theoretical literature discussing the quality of appellate review. Part II discusses the 
means by which we undertook to evaluate the quality of appellate review: Part II.A 
presents the legal setting of appeals of core bankruptcy proceedings, and Part II.B sets out 
the hypotheses we sought to test. Part III explains how we tested the hypotheses. Part 
III.A details the data we compiled and the essential features of those data. The next two 
Parts present the findings of our statistical analyses, with Part III.B explicating the 
bivariate descriptive statistics and Part III.C presenting the results of regression tests we 
conducted. 
I. EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Assembling an exhaustive list of the ideal elements of appellate review would 
present no small task. However, the academic literature does suggest several attributes 
that will tend to contribute to better appellate review. 
First, commentators laud the use of panels of judges, rather than single judges, to 
hear appeals. There are two justifications. First, to the extent that there is an objectively 
“correct” answer to a question of law posed on appeal, and to the extent that there is a 
greater than 50% chance that each appellate judge will reach that “correct” answer, the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem instructs that a panel of judges will more likely reach the 
“correct” answer than will a single appellate judge.1 Second, even to the extent that one 
might question the validity of the assumptions underlying the applicability of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate review,2 there is an argument that the 
collegial nature of multimember appellate panels contributes to reflective decisionmaking 
and thus to the quality of appellate review.3 
A second factor that contributes positively to appellate review is expertise of the 
appellate decisionmaking in the subject matter of the appeal.4 Thus, for example, 
Congress created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with an eye 
                                                 
1 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations 
of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022-23 (2004) (describing Condorcet Jury Theorem). 
2 See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 112-13 & nn.130-31 (2003) (questioning the applicability of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem in the context of appellate judicial decisionmaking). 
3 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1639 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 
100-02 (1986). But see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that judges on an appellate panel of the same political 
party are more likely to vote ideologically); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004) 
(finding some evidence of ideological voting on federal courts of appeals).  
4 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 115 
(1997) (“Specialization offers two major advantages: expertise and uniformity.”). For an argument that it 
might benefit the legal system to have some judges with expertise in areas other than law, see Adrian 
Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices? (Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 134), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943369. 
5 
to creating an appellate body with the expertise to deal effectively with the complex area 
of patent law.5  
Third, courts and commentators identify general “lawfinding ability”—as distinct 
from expertise in particular areas of law—as a virtue for appellate review.6 While the 
Supreme Court has characterized the presence of multijudge panels as “[p]erhaps most 
important” in assessing lawfinding ability,7 it has also indicated other factors tend to 
enhance lawfinding ability in the appellate setting. Specifically, lawfinding ability is 
greater when (i) the judges have schedules that allow time for reflection;8 (ii) the judges 
resolve legal issues once the factual record is fully developed;9 and (iii) the attorneys may 
focus on the legal issues in question without the distraction of trial advocacy.10   
A fourth factor that tends to be associated with the quality of appellate review is 
the extent to which an appellate court conforms to traditional appellate hierarchy.11 
Courts in the United States are organized according to a standard hierarchy: Trial courts 
decide cases in the first instance, with a first appeal as of right to an intermediate 
appellate court and a second appeal to a high court at the discretion of that court.12 Within 
that hierarchy are rules of precedent that, while not absolute, create barriers against courts 
overruling holdings of earlier cases. As a general matter, under so-called horizontal stare 
decisis, high courts and intermediate appellate courts will follow their own earlier 
precedents.13 Further, vertical stare decisis binds inferior courts generally to follow 
governing precedents issued by superior courts within the hierarchy.14  
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petheridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114-17 (2004).  
6 See Nash, Resuscitating Deference, supra note 1, at 1022.  
7 Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).  
8 Id. at 231 (noting, with a negative connotation from the perspective of lawfinding ability, that district 
judges “preside alone over fast-paced trials”). 
9 Id. at 232.  
10 Id. at 231-32.  
11 See, e.g., Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 67, 68 (2006) (“The essence of the American system of precedent as experienced in practice 
resides in the great authority and hierarchical arrangement of the courts.”); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between 
Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2047 (2004) 
(suggesting that appellate review and appellate hierarchy are integrally related by noting that “the various 
characteristics and functions of appellate review . . . suggest that some gradation of judicial authority is 
central to the nature of appellate review,” and that “[a]n appellate system of review is one defined by 
hierarchy”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 998 (2002) (“[T]he 
development of an appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher levels and stringent rules of 
vertical stare decisis operates structurally to ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions alone, 
inflict too much damage on the judiciary by making aberrant or overly ambitious decisions.”). But cf. 
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that the common 
principal-agent model for analyzing lower court efforts to fulfill appellate court mandates ignores the 
allocation of discretion to lower courts), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=936769. 
12 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607-08 (1995) (elucidating the traditional 
appellate hierarchy).  
13 Absent en banc review, courts of appeals as bound by prior decisions issued by the court 
(independent of panel composition). E.g., United States v. Myers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000).   
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It is true that court systems need not have the features of appellate hierarchy and 
stare decisis to function, and indeed to function well.15 Indeed, commentators debate 
whether Congress might statutorily alter or abrogate the traditional rules of stare decisis, 
as well as the normative questions of whether it should.16 Nonetheless, whether it is 
constitutionally mandated or normatively desirable, the assumption underlying the 
dominant U.S. judicial structure is that horizontal and vertical stare decisis provide 
precedential power to decisions by appellate courts. Assuming that judges seek to arrive 
at correct outcomes,17 these standard rules of precedent presumably increase the quality 
                                                                                                                                                 
In general, horizontal stare decisis does not extend beyond the court that issued an opinion to sibling 
courts of the same hierarchical level. While intermediate appellate courts will follow decisions issued by 
earlier panels of the same court—notwithstanding that the composition of the judges on the panels may 
vary—intermediate appellate courts generally are under no precedential obligation to follow decisions 
issued by sibling intermediate appellate courts of similar hierarchical rank. Thus, for example, a Ninth 
Circuit panel may find First Circuit precedent to be persuasive and choose to follow it, but stare decisis 
does not demand that the Ninth Circuit so act; rather, stare decisis leaves the Ninth Circuit free to disagree 
with and to disregard the First Circuit precedent.  See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824-25 (1994). Also the rule of horizontal 
precedent does not extend to trial courts, as discussed below. See id. at 825 (“[A] district court judge may 
ignore the decisions of ‘foreign’ courts of appeals as well as other district court judges, even within the 
same district.” (footnote omitted)); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609; Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis 
and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003). But see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and 
Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1095 (1994) (noting a “long 
tradition” of district judges deviating from prior precedent in the same district only in extraordinary 
circumstances); infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
14 See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609; Susan B. Haire, Stefanie Lindquist, & Donald R. 
Songer, Appellate Court Structure in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 143, 145 (2003) (“Appellate oversight in the lower tires of the federal judicial hierarchy . . . provides 
a process through which circuit judges are expected to promote legal rules that will guide decision making 
in subsequent cases”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (“[C]ourts generally issue written decisions that, 
when published, have precedential effect on future rulings involving different parties.”).  
15 For example, civil law systems do not rely upon as stringent a hierarchy, or upon rules of precedent 
as stringent. See, e.g., Thomas Lundmark, Book Review, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 211, 214-15 (1998) (“One of 
the classic differences between civil-law and common-law jurisdictions is that the former do not recognize 
judicial precedent as an independent source of law.”) (reviewing INTERPRETIVE PRECEDENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997); Caminker, supra note 13, 
at 826; Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1608. For an exposition, and critique, of the necessity and desirability 
of stare decisis, see Caminker, supra note 13.  
16 Compare, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on 
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (2001) (arguing in favor of the constitutional status of 
stare decisis); Caminker, supra note 13, at 828-34 (arguing that the constitutional case for the binding 
nature of Supreme Court precedent on lower federal courts is “quite powerful”), with Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and 
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000) (arguing to the contrary); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over 
the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000) (same); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: 
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMM. 191 (2001) (same); Thomas 
Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001) (same). See also 
Barrett, supra note 13 (arguing that some applications of stare decisis may implicate due process concerns).  
17 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing economic 
theory of stare decisis that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to answer the expected number of ‘correct’ answers 
subject to its resource constraint”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 
746-47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an “interpretive community” that subscribes to the rule of 
law).   
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of appellate review. It stands to reason that a court that knows that its opinion will be 
binding upon that court, and possibly also on lower courts, in the future will consider 
more carefully its reasoning before issuing judgments and opinions that announce new 
rules of law.18 Relatedly, the focus on cases that raise novel legal questions should allow 
appellate courts to conserve judicial resources, apply them in cases in which they are 
truly needed, and thus to reach correct answers more frequently.19  
A fifth factor that many commentators identify as an ingredient of judicial quality 
is judicial independence.20 Judges who enjoy greater independence, it is said, are less 
likely to be swayed by irrelevant, nonjudicial concerns. The American Founding Fathers 
subscribed to this view,21 and accordingly vested Article III judges with presumptive life 
tenure and the guarantee of nonreduction in salary.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
Even if goals other than arriving at the correct outcome motivate judges, see, e.g., Erin O’Hara, Social 
Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 736 (1993) (arguing that judges’ self-interest—including judges’ interest in expanding their 
influence—explains the development of horizontal stare decisis); infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text, 
the fact remains that, to the extent that the U.S. judicial system substantially relies on the traditional 
hierarchical form and rules, the extent to which a court comports with that norm will increase the 
perception that it is reaching correct decisions.  
18 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1623 (“In a completely decentralized system each judge would 
have to attend to the caseload of every other judge in order to identify appropriate cases for review; in a 
hierarchical system, only the appellate judges need have a systemic perspective on caseload.”); cf. id. at 
1620 (noting that, absent horizontal precedent, “each judge is more likely to give each case intensive 
consideration” (emphasis added)); id. at 1624 (arguing in favor of “strict vertical precedent because the 
hierarchical structure creates a division of labor between levels of the hierarchy”); id. at 1625-27 (arguing 
in favor of horizontal precedent at the appellate, but not the trial, level).  
19 See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1622-24; Caminker, supra note 13, at 839-43. Of course, a cost in 
such a system is that the first court may resolve the legal question incorrectly, and then bind future courts to 
that rule. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 737 n.3 (identifying the “primary social cost of stare decisis” as 
“the entrenchment of bad decisions”); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare 
Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989) (discussing reliance by a court on earlier decisions by that court, 
even if wrongly decided, as an optimization problem and as varying depending upon institutional 
structure).  
There are other social benefits that rules of stare decisis provide—certainty, predictability, fairness, 
and consistency. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 843-56 (discussing the desire to avoid “delayed justice,” 
the greater decisionmaking proficiency of superior courts, and uniform interpretation and application of law 
as consequentialist justifications for stare decisis); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 74-78 (discussing the 
fairness, competence, and certainty as justifications for stare decisis). These benefits, however, are not the 
result of the courts necessarily reaching correct conclusions. Indeed, these benefits would inhere if courts 
uniformly reached bad decisions. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 3, at 105 (contrasting consistency, 
soundness, and coherence).  
20 See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence 
from the American States, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 399, 422-24 (2006) (finding a strong correlation between 
judicial independence and court quality); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
2168, 2171 (2006). But see Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and 
Economic Development 1 (USC Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. C06-1, 2006) (“There 
is some evidence that judicial independence is associated with economic growth, but the evidence is mixed 
and causation is unclear.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490. 
21 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, 81 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison).  
22 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.  
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II. INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
At its essence, an appeal involves a claim that a trial court committed some form 
of error—for example, failure to follow proper procedure or improper application of the 
law. Accordingly, we might say that one of the primary functions of an appellate court, if 
not the core function, is to ascertain whether the alleged error truly occurred. As we have 
already discussed, theorists have posited various attributes that improve the quality of 
appellate review. While plausible that some of these factors may contribute more than 
others to improving the quality of appellate review, it seems reasonable to conclude that, 
on balance, as between two different appellate tribunals, the one that has more of the 
features of quality appellate review will better perform the appellate function. 
The two-tiered system of bankruptcy appeals strikes us as an excellent field for an 
empirical investigation of how alternative appellate structures may affect the quality of 
appellate review.  The current appellate structure provides for appeals of bankruptcy 
court decisions in “core” bankruptcy proceedings to be heard, in the alternative, by two 
different appellate tribunals—federal district courts and federal bankruptcy appellate 
panels (commonly referred to as “BAPs”). Of particular interest for purposes of this 
Article, based on the criteria we identified above in Part I, we identify the BAP as the 
stronger of the two appellate courts—that is, better equipped to carry out the core 
appellate function of identifying alleged error. We investigate this hypothesis through the 
study of appeals in core bankruptcy proceedings. We seek to unearth evidence that will 
inform scholarly inquiry into the hallmarks of the quality of appellate review and that will 
illuminate areas warranting further exploration. 
This part sets the backdrop for our empirical study. First, we describe the 
bankruptcy judicial structure with primary emphasis on the manner in which appeals 
progress through it. We then discuss our approach for empirically investigating the 
theoretical proposition that BAPs are the stronger of the two appellate courts in 
performing appellate function at the first tier of review and develop a series of hypotheses 
to test the theory. 
A. The Bankruptcy Appellate Process 
Unlike any other part of the federal judicial system, the bankruptcy appeals 
process routinely involves two levels of intermediate review. This anomalous state of 
affairs can be traced to congressional reform efforts from the 1970s that sought to 
improve the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining it in a 
subordinate relationship to the district court.23  
Under the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898,24 district courts delegated much of their responsibility over bankruptcy cases to 
“bankruptcy referees,” individuals appointed by a panel of district judges for a six-year 
                                                 
23 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
47, 123 (1997) (noting that “double appeal system was a concession to the federal judges, a symbol of the 
subordination of the bankruptcy court to the district court”).  
24See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).  
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term.25 The limited role and status of the referees at the inception of the Bankruptcy Act 
expanded over time, which in turn increased the cadre of full-time judicial officers 
involved in the administration of bankruptcy cases.26 Eventually, the rules of bankruptcy 
procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1973 redesignated referees as 
“bankruptcy judges.”27 This change, however, did not remove the distinction between 
bankruptcy judges and Article III judges, including, for example, “prohibitions against 
bankruptcy judges using the elevators, parking lots, and dining rooms reserved for Article 
III judges.”28 Moreover, some Article III judges continued to refer to bankruptcy judges 
as “referees” in spite of the statutory change.29 Sentiments such as these infused their way 
into the policymaking debates over bankruptcy reform in the 1970s. 
Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States to analyze the Bankruptcy Act and to suggest recommendations for its 
reform.30 While the original resolution creating the Commission proposed that the Chief 
Justice would appoint two bankruptcy judges as commissioners, strident opposition led, 
among others, by District Judge Edward Weinfeld, chair of the Judicial Conference’s 
Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System, resulted in passage of the 
resolution without constraints on whom the Chief Justice could appoint.31 The Chief 
Justice did not to appoint any bankruptcy judges to the Commission, instead appointing 
Judge Weinfeld and District Judge Hubert Will.32 Judge Weinfeld’s efforts had the result 
of excluding bankruptcy judges from engaging in policymaking discussions on 
bankruptcy reform within the organizational framework of both the Commission and the 
Judicial Conference.33 That the federal judiciary went to great lengths to oppose the 
inclusion of bankruptcy judges in the reform process highly suggests that Article III 
judges feared loss of power and prestige in the event Congress increased the power of 
bankruptcy judges.34 It is this dynamic that underlies the current bankruptcy judicial 
structure and the anomaly of double appeals. Only one level of intermediate appellate 
                                                 
25 Posner, supra note 23, at 61-62.  
26 See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress and the Passage of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978 (pt. 1), 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3-6 (2007) 
27 BANKR. R. 901(7) (1973) (repealed 1978).  
28 Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial 
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985). Hearsay evidence suggests 
that at least one Article III judge viewed bankruptcy judges as occupying the professional status equivalent 
to a janitor. See Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“Former Bankruptcy Judge Herb Katz recalls: ‘I am 
told—this is hearsay—but Judge Chambers, who was at the Ninth Circuit, chief judge, was asked by 
somebody . . . [why] bankruptcy judges were not allowed to come to the Judicial Conference. And he was 
alleged to have said, “If I invite those people, I have to invite the janitors as well.”’” (omission and 
alteration in original) (quoting Interview with Herbert Katz (July 1, 2004))).  
29 Posner, supra note 23, at 61 & n.25; cf. Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“As late as 1978, even 
though Judge James Browning, then chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, specifically invited five bankruptcy 
judges to attend the circuit conference, Senior District Judge Lloyd George (formerly a bankruptcy judge) 
reports that ‘they wouldn’t call me “judge.” They called me mister.’” (quoting Interview with Lloyd 
George (Dec. 20, 2004))). 
30 Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970) 
31 Mund, supra note 26, at 7. 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 See Posner, supra note 23, at 8. 
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review would have been needed had Congress made bankruptcy judges co-equals with 
district court judges, but that was not to be the case.   
With enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,35 Congress effectuated a 
complete overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system that had been in place for 80 years. 
While there were proposals to vest bankruptcy judges with Article III status,36 Congress 
ultimately rejected that notion, at least in part with the support of current and former 
Article III judges.37 Congress instead decided to establish the bankruptcy courts as 
“adjuncts” of the federal district courts. Bankruptcy jurisdiction was statutorily vested in 
the district courts, yet the statute also directed that all of that jurisdiction was to be 
exercised by the bankruptcy courts, which were to be staffed by Article I judges.38  
The Supreme Court rejected the 1978 Act’s jurisdictional structure in Northern 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.39 The Court in Marathon held that 
the 1978 Act violated Article III by vesting federal judicial power in Article I bankruptcy 
judges. The Marathon decision forced Congress to repair the constitutional infirmity. 
Lobbying by Article III judges led Congress yet again to reject a solution of affording 
bankruptcy judges Article III status.40 Instead, Congress simply modified the 1978 
structure. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 statutorily 
established the bankruptcy judges, who are appointed by the courts of appeals,41 as 
“unit[s]” of the district courts.42 Thus, parties technically should file bankruptcy cases in 
federal district court.  However, the Act authorized each district court to “refer” “any or 
all cases” or “proceedings” to the bankruptcy judges.43 District courts in turn have 
implemented “standing orders” that refer in the first instance bankruptcy cases to the 
bankruptcy courts.44  
                                                 
35 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended primarily 
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
36 See Countryman, supra note 28, at 7-8.  
37 See id. at 8-9; Posner, supra note 23, at 77 (“The federal judges opposed the creation of more 
independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment power over bankruptcy 
judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities, and (2) their status would be diluted through the 
vast increase in the number of federal judicial positions.”).  
Interestingly, as Congress considered various proposals for reorganizing the court structure of the 
bankruptcy system in its reform efforts from the 1970s that led to enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, 
bankruptcy judges did not seek Article III status. Instead, they lobbied Congress for appointment by the 
judicial council, rather than the president, for two reasons: First, they believed their merit would be 
properly recognized in a nonpolitical judicial appointment process; and, second, they feared that sitting 
judges would lack the political connections necessary for presidential appointment.  See Mund, supra note 
26, at 20-21, 24-25, 29. For a political economic analysis of the 1978 Act’s treatment of bankruptcy judges, 
see Posner, supra note 23, at 74-94.  
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1976).  
39 458 U.S. 50 (1982).  
40 See Countryman, supra note 28, at 31.  
41 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).  
42 28 U.S.C. § 151; see also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges shall serve as judicial officers 
of the United States district court established under Article III of the Constitution.”).  
43 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
44 9 AM. JUR. 2d (Bankruptcy) § 731; Bussel, supra note 13, at 1066 & n.12.  
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In determining the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s authority to resolve a dispute 
within a bankruptcy case,45 it is necessary under to categorize the proceeding as “core” or 
non-core.  Absent the consent of all parties, bankruptcy judges may only issue 
recommendations for the resolution of non-core proceedings, with de novo district court 
review upon objection by either party.46 Appellate review thereafter lies to the 
appropriate federal court of appeals, and thence to the Supreme Court, in line with the 
typical federal appellate hierarchy.47  
Core proceedings, on the other hand, are those that, in effect, lie at the heart of a 
bankruptcy case,48 and that bankruptcy judges are empowered to resolve definitively, in 
the first instance, with appellate review to follow.49 Here, however, there may be more 
than one possible appellate path.  
The statute authorizes the judicial council of each circuit to establish a 
“bankruptcy appellate panel”—commonly known as a “BAP”—comprised of bankruptcy 
judges from that circuit.50 BAPs are now constituted—and have been constituted since 
                                                 
45 Disputes in bankruptcy cases generally assume one of two forms: (1) an adversary proceeding or (2) 
a contested matter. Adversary proceedings include, for example, a proceeding to recover money or 
property, a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien, a proceeding to object to or 
revoke a discharge; and a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
7001. Such proceedings begin and go forward much as would any other federal lawsuit insofar as Part VII 
of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which governs such proceedings, virtually incorporates the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (occasionally with some modifications). See, e.g., id. 7003 (Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 3); id. 7004(a) (portions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4); id. 7005 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 5); id. 7012(b) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)-(h)); id. 7013 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 13); id. 7014 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 14); id. 7056 (Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56). Disputes between parties that are not adversary proceedings are called “contested matters,” 
and they proceed according to less complex procedures than adversary proceedings—including request for 
relief by motion rather than the filing of a complaint See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014; see also Khachikyan v. 
Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“In a contested matter, there is no 
summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims and third-party practice do not apply, 
and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or dispensed with in the interest of time.”).  
46 The Judicial Code describes a non-core proceeding as “a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but 
is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
47 Caminker, supra note 13, at 824-25 (discussing the standard federal appellate court hierarchy).  
48 Section 157(b)(1) speaks of “core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 
11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). In turn, section 157(b)(2) lists examples of core proceedings, which include 
matters concerning (1) administration of the estate, (2) the allowance of claims, (3) objections to discharge, 
and (4) plan confirmation. Id. § 157(b)(2).  
49 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Unless, that is, the district court withdraws the reference to the bankruptcy 
court. See id. § 157(d). In that case, the district court hears the matter in the first instance, with appeals in 
the ordinary course lying to the court of appeals and then the Supreme Court. See Bussel, supra note 13, at 
1067, 1100. 
50 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The statute also authorizes the creation of intercircuit BAPs, see id. 
§ 158(b)(4), but none has yet been created. 
Much as the bankruptcy court is unit of the district court, the bankruptcy appellate panels may be seen 
as "a unit of the federal courts of appeals." Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Federal Judiciary—
United States Courts of Appeals, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals/bap.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2007); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (requiring BAPs to be established, and BAP judges to be appointed, 
by the circuit judicial council); B.A.P. 8th Cir. R. 8016A(a)(1) ("The Clerk of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit shall serve as the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for 
the Eighth Circuit."). Compare Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 
B.R. 614, 620-21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (describing BAP as unit of the court of appeals), with The 
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1996—in the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.51 For a circuit BAP to be 
empowered to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts in a given district, a majority of 
district judges in the district must vote to authorize it.52 Unless a party elects otherwise, 
appeals of bankruptcy judges’ rulings in core proceedings will lie to the BAP (in those 
circuits that have created them and in districts that have authorized it).53 Appeals from 
BAP rulings lie to the court of appeals.54 Parties may seek, as usual, discretionary review 
by the Supreme Court of rulings by the court of appeals.   
If either the appellant or the appellee so elects—or if the circuit has not created a 
BAP or, even if it has, if the district court in question has not voted to authorize BAP 
appeals—then the district court—in the person of a single district judge—initially hears 
appeals of bankruptcy court rulings in core proceedings.55 The judgment of the district 
court may then be appealed to the appropriate federal court of appeals,56 with 
discretionary Supreme Court review the remaining appellate step. In short, then, certain 
parties in some circuits have an option between two possible appellate paths.57 We 
illustrate this in Figure 1.58 
                                                                                                                                                 
Honorable Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon, Are BAP Decisions Binding on Any Court?, 18 
CAL. BANKR. J. 189, 197 (1990) (describing BAP as unit of district court). 
51 The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were designed to encourage circuit courts to create 
BAPs by directing that each circuit “shall establish” a BAP unless the circuit judicial council finds that 
existing judicial resources are insufficient to establish one or that its establishment would result in undue 
delay or increased cost to parties in cases under the Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The six 
regional circuits that voted against establishing BAPs “concluded that the appellate process was functioning 
well as already constituted and that BAPs would create undue delay or increase the cost of appeals.” The 
Honorable Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. 
L.J. 212, 214 n.10 (1998) (citing Elizabeth Abbott, Bankruptcy Review Panel Makes Debut, NAT’L L.J., 
Mar. 3, 1997, at B1).  
On the history of BAPs, see Bryan T. Camp, Bound by the BAP: The Stare Decisis Effects of BAP 
Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1648-60 (1997); infra note 75.   
52 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). In the mid-1990s, when a Second Circuit BAP was in existence, “only three 
districts participate[d]—and these together typically receive less than a third of all bankruptcy petitions 
filed in the Second Circuit.” Camp, supra note 51, at 1660. These facts, presumably, played a large role in 
the ultimate decision to disband the Second Circuit BAP. 
53 28 U.S.C. § 158(c).  
54 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  
55 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” 
Faring?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 108 (2005) (“Appeals from bankruptcy courts to the district court . . . have 
steadily declined over sixteen years from 4300 in 1988 to 2800 in 2004, attributable, in part, to the 
establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels in four of the circuits.”). 
56 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  
57 See generally Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation in 
Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483, 490-500 (elucidating the differences between the standard federal 
judicial hierarchy and the bankruptcy appellate system); Camp, supra note 51, at 1644 (“BAPs . . . shake up 
the normal hierarchical structure dear to many attorneys’ hearts.”).  
58 We should note that a third possible appellate path not yet discussed—that of direct appeal from the 
bankruptcy court to the court of appeals—exists for a limited set of circumstances. By virtue of amendment 
to the Judicial Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, appeal may proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification 
procedure if one of the following circumstances exists: (1) the appeal involves a question of law unresolved 
by the court of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public 
importance; (3) the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions, or (4) 
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FIGURE 1 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
 
It seems, a priori, that BAPs have more of the features of quality appellate review 
in greater amounts than do the federal district courts. First, bankruptcy appellate panels 
are collegial bodies, who decide cases in three-judge panels. Indeed, bankruptcy judges 
who serve on BAPs themselves believe that decision by a panel of judges is beneficial.59 
By contrast, bankruptcy appeals to district courts are heard by a single district judge.  
Second, the bankruptcy judges who comprise bankruptcy appellate panels are (by 
virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy judges) presumably experts in bankruptcy 
law.60 Thus, they are well suited to resolve legal issues that might arise in core 
                                                                                                                                                 
the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken. 28 
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A). 
59 Mabey, supra note 55, at 123 (“Several [surveyed bankruptcy judges] acknowledged that they find 
the collaborative effort and consensus-building required for service on the BAP challenging and very 
different from what they are used to as single, independent bankruptcy judges but, at the same time, 
beneficial, because it makes them more patient and more effective in writing decisions.”).  
60 See, e.g., Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy 
practitioners in their prior careers.”); see also id. at 123 (noting that, of a random survey of bankruptcy 
judges in 2005, “[a]bout 83% . . . were bankruptcy practitioners before taking the bankruptcy bench” and 
that, “[o]f the 17% . . . who were not bankruptcy practitioners, almost all came from a business law 
background, as commercial litigators or corporate transactional lawyers,” and further noting that the 
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bankruptcy proceedings.61 District judges, by contrast, are not generally versed in 
bankruptcy law.62  
The third factor—“other” lawfinding ability63—appears to favor neither district 
judges nor bankruptcy appellate panels. Attorneys filing appellate briefs may focus on the 
legal issues without the distractions of trial advocacy, presumably whether the briefs will 
be filed with the district court or appellate panel. Similarly, both district judges and 
bankruptcy appellate panels hear legal issues once a factual record has been established. 
Last, while district judges and bankruptcy judges both preside over trials, neither the 
district judge hearing a bankruptcy appeal, nor bankruptcy judges sitting on a bankruptcy 
appellate panel, are presiding over trials at that time.64  
Fourth, bankruptcy appellate panels conform to traditional notions of appellate 
review: Their rulings are generally seen to be binding on future bankruptcy appellate 
panels drawn from the same circuit.65 Further, at least one BAP has held that its decisions 
                                                                                                                                                 
surveyed bankruptcy judges felt that their prior experience was very helpful on the bench); cf. id. at 113-16 
(discussing the trend among bankruptcy judges to hire more permanent, as opposed to term, law clerks, and 
noting that those bankruptcy judges who preferred permanent clerks often hired clerks with legal 
experience, and in particular practice experience in bankruptcy law).  
61 See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“[T]he BAP is desirable because it allows specialist 
bankruptcy judges to replace nonspecialist federal judges.”).  
62 One might argue that even district judges with no experience in bankruptcy experience before 
ascending to the bench gain some experience by virtue of hearing a steady stream of bankruptcy cases. A 
study by the Federal Judicial Center of the bankruptcy appellate structure, however, reached the opposite 
conclusion, observing that “[t]he number of first-level reviewers greatly exceeds the number of bankruptcy 
judges producing the judgments reviewed, and appellate caseloads are spread thinly among district judges, 
giving few judges much opportunity to develop bankruptcy expertise.” Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. 
Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 627 (2002).  
63 We employ the modifier “other” because, as noted above, the Court suggested that the use of 
multijudge panels is “[p]erhaps most important” in assessing lawfinding ability. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text.  
64 It is this factor that, presumably, vests district judges with lawfinding ability when they sit by 
designation on court of appeals panels. See Nash, Resuscitating Deference, supra note 1, at 1031 
(explaining that the better term is lawfinding “ability” and not lawfinding “expertise”).  
One might argue that lawfinding ability is enhanced to the extent that the judge (whether district or 
bankruptcy) enjoys relief from her other responsibilities while hearing appeals. This seems not to be the 
case, however, at least for bankruptcy judges:  
When asked how BAP service affects their service as a bankruptcy judge, several of the [surveyed 
bankruptcy judges] indicated that it required adjustments to their bankruptcy court trial and hearing 
schedule and that it substantially added to their workload. Some of the Survey Participants suggested that 
those bankruptcy judges who serve full-time on the BAP should have the option of employing an additional 
law clerk. One Survey Participant indicated that service on the BAP was “like having a second job.” 
Mabey, supra note 55, at 122 (footnote omitted); see also Honorable Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of 
the Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1330 (1993) 
(“The fundamental truth which is the basis for this article is that the bankruptcy caseload in many districts 
in this country is so overwhelming that the bankruptcy judges are sorely pressed in the struggle to cope 
with it.”).  
65 BAPs in three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth—have reached this conclusion. E.g., In re 
Luedtke, 215 B.R. 390, 391 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (BAP bound by prior decisions, citing circuit court 
cases saying that circuit court panels bind subsequent circuit court panels); Ball v. Payco-Gen. Am. Credits, 
Inc. (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595, 597 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“We will not overrule our prior rulings unless a 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Supreme Court decision or subsequent legislation has undermined 
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are binding on all bankruptcy courts within that circuit,66 even if the bankruptcy courts 
themselves do not share this view.67 In contrast, one district judge is generally seen to be 
under no obligation to follow the ruling of another district judge—even one in the same 
district—whether on matters of bankruptcy or otherwise.68 And bankruptcy courts have 
                                                                                                                                                 
those rulings.”); Salomon N. Am. v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave), 328 B.R. 176, 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2005) (reaffirming that the BAP will not overrule its prior rulings unless an intervening circuit court or 
Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation, undermines those rulings); Concannon v. Imperial Cap. 
Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 95 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (same); In re Blagg, 223 B.R. 795, 804 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (“Our decision is dictated by the principle that we are bound by prior panel 
decisions. A panel cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of the court.”), appeal dismissed, 198 
F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 1999); Smolen v. Hatley (In re Hatley), 227 B.R. 757, 761 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) 
(same), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 1999).  
66 Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot (In re Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876, 879 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) 
(“BAP decisions originating in any district in the Ninth Circuit are binding precedent on all bankruptcy 
courts within the Ninth Circuit in the absence of any contrary authority from the district court for the 
district in which the bankruptcy court sits.”); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
1987) (“One of the reasons for establishing the BAP was to provide a uniform and consistent body of 
bankruptcy law throughout the entire Circuit. In order to achieve this desired uniformity, the decisions of 
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel must be binding on all of the bankruptcy courts from which review may be 
sought, i.e. each district in the Ninth Circuit.”), rev’d on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988). 
67 Compare, e.g., Ore. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 B.R. 59, 62 (D. 
Ore. 1990) (BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in the district out of which the appeal 
arose), with Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson), 255 B.R. 267 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) 
(rejecting argument that substantial motivation of Congress in creating BAPs was to generate a uniform 
body of bankruptcy law within the circuits; concluding that there is no principled reason why decisions of a 
BAP should have more precedential authority than those of district courts; odd and unseemly, if not 
unconstitutional, for a BAP—comprised of three Article I judges—to be generating for bankruptcy judges, 
and perhaps also for district judges, the law of the circuit until the circuit court had spoken); In re Virden, 
279 B.R. 401, 409 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (same), and Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 
173 B.R. 672, 676-80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 99 F.3d 1520 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that BAPs bind bankruptcy courts on matters arising in core proceedings even though district 
courts do not). For further discussion regarding the precedential effect of BAP decisions, see Salomon N. 
Am., 328 B.R. at 181 n.2 (noting the Ninth Circuit BAP’s prior holding that its decisions bind our 
bankruptcy courts within the circuit, but also recognizing that some bankruptcy courts have rejected that 
holding); Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1989) (“BAP decisions cannot 
bind the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts must always be free to decline to 
follow BAP decisions and to formulate their own rules within their jurisdiction.”); id. at 472 (O’Scannlain, 
J., concurring) (“writ[ing] separately to propose that the Judicial Council of this Circuit consider adoption 
of an order requiring that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel . . . decisions shall bind all of the bankruptcy courts 
of the circuit, subject to the restrictions imposed by article III so well discussed in the [court’s] opinion”); 
Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing 
“binding nature of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decisions” as “an open question,” and “join[ing] Judge 
O’Scannlain’s call for the [Ninth Circuit] Judicial Council to consider an order clarifying whether the 
bankruptcy courts must follow the BAP”); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved 
Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 529 (1995) (“Even stronger 
arguments can be made against any stare decisis effect at all for the opinion of a bankruptcy appellate 
panel.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129-30 (“I would argue that district courts should be bound by 
BAP decisions. The view that an Article I court can never bind an Article III court is an overstatement.”); 
Trujillo, supra note 57, at 494 n.23 (arguing that BAPs function as district courts, and accordingly cannot 
issue binding opinions). 
68 See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 67, at 529 (noting that “[n]one of the district judges is bound by a 
bankruptcy appeals decision of a district judge from one of the other 93 district courts” and that “district 
judges in multi-judge districts are not even bound by the bankruptcy appeals decisions of other judges from 
that same district”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at 1095-96 (“Even where review lies in a district court 
16 
held that they are not bound at least by the holding of a single district judge on a 
multijudge district court.69 As such, BAPs comport more with the standard model of 
appellate hierarchy than do district courts sitting on appeal.70 
                                                                                                                                                 
composed of more than one judge, rather than a BAP, uncertain and disuniform development of bankruptcy 
law is mitigated by a long tradition within district courts of deviating from a co-ordinate judge’s prior 
decision only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Given this bias, relatively few district judges—in 
comparison to the specialist bankruptcy courts—have enough interest and confidence in their views of 
bankruptcy law to be willing to create conflicts within the district. In any event, the problem of intra-district 
conflict could be eliminated if the federal district courts would adopt “law-of-the-district” rules for 
bankruptcy appeals analogous to the “law-of-the-circuit” rules currently in effect, in most regions, at the 
Court of Appeals level. All district courts might be bound by a published precedent within the district in 
subsequent bankruptcy appeals.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1096 n.116 (“I am aware of only a 
handful of cases where district judges in the same district adopt differing views of the same question of 
bankruptcy law and in those cases one or both of the decisions is unpublished.”).  
69 See, e.g., In re Romano, 350 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005) (“[A] single decision of a district 
court in this multi-judge district is not binding upon this court.”); id. at 277-81 (summarizing authority both 
ways); Paul Steven Singerman & Paul A. Avron, Of Precedents and Bankruptcy Court Independence, 22 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (2003) (noting conflict, gathering authorities, and finding that a majority of 
bankruptcy courts have held that they are not bound by the decision of a single district court judge in a 
multi-judge district); Trujillo, supra note 57, at 494 (arguing that bankruptcy decision by one bankruptcy 
judge cannot bind other bankruptcy judges in the same district, and that bankruptcy decision by one district 
judge cannot bind other district judges or any bankruptcy judges in the same district). But see Chemerinsky, 
supra note 4, at 129 (“While a district court exercising original jurisdiction cannot bind other district 
courts, its decisions should be binding on bankruptcy courts when the district court is serving as an appeals 
court.”).   
70 Our point here is simply that BAPs seem to fit more cleanly into the standard hierarchical appellate 
model than do district courts sitting on appeal, not that that is necessarily mandated under the current 
statutory scheme or normatively desirable. The latter two points are debatable.  
With respect to the current statutory scheme, there are statements in the legislative history indicating 
that Congress created the BAPs to help foster greater uniformity in bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 140 CONG. 
REC. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“It should be recognized that the creation 
of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a dependable body of case law.”). But see 
Daly, 255 B.R. at 273 (“Any suggestion that Congress’ authorization of the creation of BAP Services was 
motivated substantially by its desire to create a uniform body of bankruptcy law within the circuits is not 
supported by the BAP Service’s history, which instead suggests that BAPs were conceived primarily as a 
tool for relieving district court judges of an ofttimes undesirable and burdensome aspect of their 
workload.”). At the same time, one can point to the certification procedure in section 158(d)(2)—under 
which courts of appeals may decide interlocutory appeals when, among other circumstances, the question 
raised is one “as to which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)—as evidence that Congress chose other, 
explicit means of increasing bankruptcy law uniformity. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 148 (2005) 
(“[D]ecisions rendered by a district court as well as a bankruptcy appellate panel are generally not binding 
and lack stare decisis value. To address these problems, [the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005] amends section 158(d) of title 28 to establish a procedure to facilitate appeals of 
certain decisions, judgments, orders and decrees of the bankruptcy courts to the circuit courts of appeals by 
means of a two-step certification process.”), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 206. 
Commentators are divided over whether BAP decisions bind bankruptcy courts. Compare, e.g., Bussel, 
supra note 13, at 1098 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should consider both BAP and district court 
decisions as binding precedent); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“From [a] functional perspective, I 
think that BAP decisions clearly should be binding on bankruptcy courts.”); Camp, supra note 51, at 1676-
84 (arguing that BAPs should bind both bankruptcy and district courts) with Trujillo, supra note 57, at 492 
(“[O]nly opinions of the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts by 
reason of formal hierarchy.”); cf. Caminker, supra note 13, at 870-72 (arguing that theoretical 
considerations argue in favor of bankruptcy courts being bound by district court decisions). Moreover, 
17 
                                                                                                                                                 
strict application of vertical stare decisis is difficult, insofar as it is not certain until after the bankruptcy 
court has issued judgment into which appellate path the case will proceed. Cf. Camp, supra note 51, at 
1682 (“Since bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision whether it will be a BAP or a 
district court that will hear any appeal, and since no district court has so far considered itself bound by a 
BAP, it is no surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP decisions.”). (Compare this 
to the United States Tax Court, which considers itself bound by its own precedent, except insofar as it has 
also held that it is bound “to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal 
from [the] decision lies to that Court of Appeals.” Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), aff’d, 
445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Because the court of appeals to which a taxpayer will appeal is determined 
by his state of residence, see 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a), (b), it is always clear at the time of decision which 
circuit’s precedent is binding.) 
As to the normative question, there are those who argue that an increase in application of stare decisis 
would be normatively desirable. See, e.g., The Honorable Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential Effect of 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. L.J. 212, 221 (1998) (arguing that the current dual track 
appellate system makes it difficult to generate binding precedent, and that the system be changed to allow 
for development of binding precedent); Bussel, supra note 13, at 1095 n.114 (“[L]ogically . . . district 
courts . . . as well as bankruptcy courts might be bound by prior BAP decisions.”). However, there also are 
strong arguments that a structure other than the standard appellate hierarchy might be desirable. First, one 
of the bases on which the pyramidal appellate hierarchy functions is the notion that issues “percolate” up 
from the lower courts to the higher courts. It is the desire for percolation that, commentators argue, restricts 
(and properly so) application of horizontal stare decisis to the same court and not to sibling courts of equal 
hierarchical stature. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit 
Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 834 (1990) (“The rejection of intercircuit stare decisis is 
premised upon—and given the obvious costs in deferring uniformity, is explainable only in terms of—the 
benefits of dialogue among the circuits.”); see also Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: 
Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1352 (1995) (arguing, based upon social choice 
theory, that the Supreme Court “would desire intra- but not inter-circuit stare decisis,” since such a regime 
“avoids the irrationality that would result from cyclical preferences within particular circuits, while, at the 
same time, reducing the likelihood that legal doctrine that results from path manipulation in a given circuit 
will be replicated across the circuits.”). But cf. O’Hara, supra note 17, at 772 (arguing that the absence of 
stare decisis across circuits is justified on the ground that “an agreement to follow another circuit’s 
precedents will not save the judges in a particular circuit much time”). In the case of appeals of core 
bankruptcy matters, there are, anomalously, two levels of intermediate appeals. Perhaps, then, in order for 
issues properly to percolate up to the courts of appeals, there ought to be no horizontal stare decisis at the 
first intermediate level—i.e., at the level of the BAPs and district courts. 
Second, given that the BAPs and district courts lie at the same hierarchical level, it might not make 
sense for horizontal stare decisis rules to apply to BAPs but not district courts. Perhaps, once again, 
horizontal stare decisis should not apply at all. (One might argue, to the contrary, that horizontal stare 
decisis should apply to both courts. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129.)  
Third, perhaps bankruptcy law and society would be better served by a system other than the 
traditional appellate hierarchy, at the lower levels of appeals of core bankruptcy matters. Civil law systems 
rely far less on precedent than does the common law system dominant in the United States. See supra note 
15 and accompanying text. Civil law judiciaries decide cases based largely upon the proper interpretation 
of the governing “code.” Insofar as bankruptcy turns upon the content of a code—the “Bankruptcy 
Code”—bankruptcy seems to provide an ideal setting for application of such judicial review. Cf. Lawrence 
Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy 
Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 216 (2000) 
(arguing for “a softer, more nimble, rule of precedent [that] would improve the quality of outcomes in 
particular bankruptcy cases”). (Interestingly, while Ponoroff facially argues in favor of increased reliance 
on a civil law jurisprudential approach in the bankruptcy context, his arguments do not seem to accord so 
well with the principles underlying the structure of judicial review in civil law systems. Ponoroff laments: 
“The opportunity for two levels of appeal as a matter of right has contributed to the crush of reported 
decisions, a phenomenon that, in my view, has hampered pragmatic and considered decisionmaking in the 
bankruptcy courts. That problem is compounded by the disturbing rise in adherence to textual or plain 
meaning methods of interpretation in bankruptcy cases, particularly in the decisions of the circuit courts of 
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It is only the final criterion—the question of judicial independence—on which 
district courts have some advantage over bankruptcy appellate panels. Judicial 
independence has been considered to be a function of life tenure and the guarantee of 
nonreduction in salary. Both attributes have been enshrined in the Article III status 
conferred on district judges, whereas bankruptcy judges who sit on bankruptcy appellate 
panels do not get the benefit of either attribute by virtue of their Article I status.71  
On this basis, one might readily conclude that district judges enjoy judicial 
independence while bankruptcy judges do not. But this would be a facile conclusion that 
improperly casts the assessment of judicial independence as an all-or-nothing 
proposition—that is, judicial independence as attainable only through life tenure and the 
guarantee of nonreducible remuneration. Careful consideration of the matter, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
appeal[s].” Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted). Ponoroff thus seems more concerned with allowing different 
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code to percolate up through the judiciary. He also seems to embrace 
more of a realist conception of bankruptcy law than a civil law conception, explaining, “A more forward-
looking, and less technical and ‘busy,’ code would abate the pressure to decide and review cases on the 
kind of formal, textualist grounds that typically prove the most difficult to distinguish in subsequent cases.” 
Id. at 216. Indeed, Ponoroff acknowledges that he endorses “a different style of judging, one that eschews a 
strict adherence to precedent, but not by any means civilian, to the extent that style is perceived as the 
unimaginative and rote application of positive legal rules to particular fact situations performed by a cadre 
of mid-level bureaucrats.” Id. at 223. “Rather,” he endorses “a style that actually places greater 
responsibility on the decisionmaker to reason analogically from code principles, as well as from subsidiary 
sources such as custom, usages, settled jurisprudential doctrine, and equity.” Id. at 223-24.)  
To the possible objection that the fact that the higher levels of bankruptcy judicial review—courts of 
appeals and the Supreme Court—rely upon the standard appellate hierarchy, one can point to the 
coexistence of Louisiana’s civil law system within the United States judicial system as an example of how 
such a system can function. See, e.g., Shelp v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964) (in determining 
Louisiana law under Erie, federal courts should apply precedential rules that Louisiana state courts apply); 
Alvin Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 
LA. L. REV. 1369 (1988) (article written by Fifth Circuit Judge endorsing Shelp). But see John Burnitt 
McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference Erie Rule for Louisiana State Court 
Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313 (2006). Indeed, the notion that bankruptcy courts do not consider themselves 
bound by rulings of single district judges in multijudge districts—and therefore presumably do at some 
point consider themselves bound once a number of district judges in the same district reach the same 
conclusion—resembles the “jurisprudence constante” under which precedent develops in Louisiana and 
other civil law systems. See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic 
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (describing jurisprudence constante as 
a doctrine under which “a case may be used to discern a pattern [of decisions] that may aid in 
interpretation”); Stearns, supra, at 1357 n.143 (discussing jurisprudence constante); cf. RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 257 (1985) (proposing, “as a special rule of stare 
decisis, the practice that when the first three circuits to decide an issue have decided it the same way, the 
remaining circuits defer to that decision”). Any potential difficulties in integrating a civil law precedential 
model into the larger common law-based federal court system would be mitigated by the fact that the vast 
majority of bankruptcy cases are not appealed beyond the first level of intermediate appellate review. See 
Bussel, supra note 13, at 1091; cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that “[b]ankruptcy law 
matters seem to fit in between . . . two poles” in that “bankruptcy statutes are filled with ambiguities that 
require court interpretation,” while there also “probably exist particular types of disputes where the law-
giving function of the court is less important and alternative dispute resolution would be potentially more 
efficient”). But cf. Bussel, supra note 13, at 1097 (“I would have difficulty understanding why Congress 
would intend BAPs and district courts to serve merely as rest-stops on the road to real appellate review.”). 
71 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.  
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suggests that the difference may be narrower than that generally perceived by courts and 
commentators. 
A more felicitous account reveals that the term of appointment for bankruptcy 
judges, the standard for their removal from office, the treatment afforded to their 
compensation, and the manner of their appointment afford bankruptcy judges a moderate 
amount of judicial independence. First, although bankruptcy judges do not get life tenure, 
the term of their appointment lasts fourteen years.72 The appointments, moreover, may be 
renewed,73 and indeed in most cases are renewed.74 While judicial independence may be 
fostered by life tenure, the renewable, fourteen-year term of bankruptcy judges places 
them in a position to serve as long as many of their Article III counterparts.75  Even if the 
absence of life tenure gives Congress leeway to reduce the term of bankruptcy judges76—
an option that it has never exercised since it created the bankruptcy courts—still the 
fourteen-year, renewable term certainly grants a fair amount of judicial independence to 
bankruptcy judges.77 
Second, the Judicial Code prescribes that a bankruptcy judge may be removed 
“only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability,”78 
whereas the Constitution mandates that an Article III will hold his or her office only 
“during good Behaviour.”79 The broad language of the good-behavior standard for 
removal arguably encompasses the grounds set forth by the Judicial Code for removal of 
bankruptcy judges. Moreover, while Article III judges may be removed only by 
impeachment80 and bankruptcy judges may be removed by a majority of all of the judges 
                                                 
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).  
73 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat. 3847, 3852 
(providing that, “[w]en filling vacancies, the court of appeals may consider reappointing incumbent 
bankruptcy judges under procedures prescribed by regulations issued by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States”). 
74 See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (noting that, of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench in the 
decade prior to 2005, only 10 did so as a result of not being reappointed); see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations § 1(e) (June 2001) (providing that 
“[t]he court of appeals shall decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent [bankruptcy] judge before 
considering other potentially qualified candidates” (emphasis added)).  
To the contrary, one might argue that the fact that bankruptcy judges must seek, and generally receive, 
reappointment, demonstrates the absence of judicial independence.  
75 Article III judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) whose service on the federal bench terminated 
between 1983 and 2003 served, on average, 24 years. Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic 
Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 618 chart 4 (2005).  
76 While Congress may reduce the duration of the fixed-term appointment for bankruptcy judges at any 
point it so desires via statute, the constitutionally-guaranteed life tenure granted to Article III judges could 
only be stripped away via constitutional amendment (an exponentially more difficult proposition).  
77 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 95 (1973) (proposing various reforms “to enhance the real and apparent judicial 
independence of bankruptcy judges,” including “[e]xtension of the term of the bankruptcy judges from the 
present six years to the proposed fifteen years.”); cf. Nash, supra note 20, at 2196 (observing that “one can 
question the degree to which life tenure in fact secures for judges a larger measure of judicial 
independence”).  
78 28 U.S.C. § 152(e). 
79 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
80 No. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion) (“The ‘good Behaviour’ Clause guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life tenure, subject only 
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of the judicial council of the circuit within which the bankruptcy judge has been 
designated to serve,81 yet the practical reality is that very few bankruptcy judges have 
been removed from office.82  If the specter of removal from office does not appear to be 
greater for bankruptcy judges than Article III judges, it follows that bankruptcy judges 
need not limit their behavior in such a way that would prevent them from acting as 
independently as an Article III judge.  
Third, although the Supreme Court has identified the “fixed and irreducible” 
compensation provided to Article III judges by the Compensation Clause as a hallmark of 
an independent judiciary,83 the lack of a similar guarantee in the salary of bankruptcy 
judges should not be overemphasized in assessing their judicial independence. Since 
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and created the current scheme for 
federal bankruptcy judgeships, the salary of bankruptcy judges has only increased.84 
Moreover, as of 1987, bankruptcy judges have received a salary at an annual rate that 
equals 92 percent of the salary of a district court judge (as determined by section 135 of 
the Judicial Code).85 Thus, for the past two decades, bankruptcy judges have had fixed 
compensation that nearly equals that of their district court counterparts. 
Finally, if one does not ignore the substantive differences in the appointment 
processes of bankruptcy judges and district judges and the consequences that flow 
therefrom, it becomes clear that bankruptcy judges may be better situated than district 
judges to avoid and resist the political influence that would threaten to compromise an 
independent judiciary. While the judicial appointment process for Article III judges has 
become increasingly politicized, evidenced most recently by the tendency for close 
examination of the ideology of nominees,86 the appointment process for bankruptcy 
judges has seemingly remained apolitical. The Judicial Code charges the task of 
appointing a bankruptcy judge to the court of appeals for the circuit in which there exists 
a vacancy for a bankruptcy judgeship.87 Thus, the appointment process for bankruptcy 
judges involves judges selecting judges—a presumably nonpolitical process.88 This 
                                                                                                                                                 
to removal by impeachment.”). But see Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal 
Judge, 116 YALE. L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that federal judges may be removed from office by means other 
than impeachment).  
81 28 U.S.C. § 152(e).  
82 See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (listing reasons for departure from the bench for the 115 
bankruptcy judges who did so in the decade prior to 2005, but not mentioning removal as one of those 
reasons). On the other hand, one might argue that the low rate of removal of bankruptcy judges reflects the 
absence of judicial independence: Bankruptcy judges have behaved in a way so as to avoid removal.  
83 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 at 59 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
84 See Mabey, supra note 55, app. A. 
85 28 U.S.C. § 153(a). Congress amended the Judicial Code in 1987 to provide for the current salary 
structure for bankruptcy judges. Pub. L. No. 100-102, § 408 (1987). 
86 See Nash, supra note 20, at 2182-92. 
87 See 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(1), (3). 
88 The possibility exists, however, that the judicial appointment of judges may substitute judicial 
patronage for political patronage and thus compromise judicial independence. See Judith Resnik, “Uncle 
Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the 
District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 673 (2002) (“Article III created judicial 
independence to avoid judges needing to curry favor in order to retain their jobs and their salaries. But 
through the power of judicial appointment, judges now have something to give. Salaries, staff support, 
courtrooms, chambers, committee assignments, and pensions come with magistrate and bankruptcy judge 
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nonpolitical process has produced a bankruptcy bench mostly populated by specialists 
with bankruptcy expertise,89 who themselves could be characterized as nonpolitical.90  
When one considers the type of jurist produced by the judicial selection process 
for bankruptcy judges in conjunction with their term of appointment, the standard for 
their removal from office, and the treatment afforded to their compensation, it would 
appear that bankruptcy judges have achieved a considerable degree of judicial 
independence.91 Accordingly, while the district court seems to enjoy some advantage 
over BAPs with respect to this final attribute that has been identified as improving the 
quality of appellate review, the advantage is not likely to be a substantial one. We 
summarize the differences in the attributes of the BAPs and district courts below in Table 
1. 
                                                                                                                                                 
positions. As life-tenured judges become a source of patronage, applicants and their supporters have more 
to gain by courting those judges.” (footnote omitted)). But see Posner, supra note 23, at 81-82 
(“Appointments by the judicial branch are not as controversial, because judges belong to different 
parties.”). Furthermore, one may argue that, insofar as the circuit judges are a product of a politicized 
appointment process, they themselves may be politicized and thus infuse politics into the appointment 
process for bankruptcy judges. The merit-selection process for appointing bankruptcy judges, however, 
seems to have provided little opportunity for such politicization to take root. A quick look at the manner in 
which the Ninth Circuit conducts this process (one that seems representative of the process conducted in 
other circuits) suggests why this has been the case. 
 Interested candidates must submit applications for the position, see JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges § 2.02 (Mar. 21, 2001), 
which the Circuit advertises nationally and which it encourages the federal judicial districts within the 
circuit to advertise intensely and locally, see id. § 2.01. A local merit screening committee, which generally 
consists of (1) the chief judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, (2) the 
president of the state bar association, (3) the president of one or more local bar associations within the 
district, (4) the dean of a law school located within the district, (5) the administrative circuit judge of the 
circuit geographical unit in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, and (6) the chief bankruptcy 
judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to be appointed, see id. § 3.02(a), recommends to the 
Court-Council Committee on Bankruptcy Appointments, whose membership includes three circuit judges 
who serve as voting members, see id. § 3.04(b), five applicants who ought to be considered for 
appointment, see id. § 3.03(c)(1). The Court-Council Committee circulates a report to the Ninth Circuit 
Judicial Council recommending a candidate for appointment, and that report will be deemed to be the 
Judicial Council’s recommendation to the Court of Appeals (unless the Council determines that the Court-
Council Committee should reconsider its recommendation). See id. §§ 3.04(c)(4); 3.05(a). The 
recommended candidate is appointed upon a majority vote of the members of the Court of Appeals. 11 
U.S.C § 152(a)(3). 
89 See Mabey, supra note 55, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy practitioners in 
their prior careers.”).  
90 Cf. Resnik, supra note 88, at 670 (2002) (“Turn first to the advantages of judicial appointment of 
judges. As a few details of current practices illustrate, the judiciary has selected a high-quality and 
relatively nonpolitical corps of judges . . . .”).  
91 This state of affairs can be traced to congressional efforts in the 1970s to elevate the status of 
bankruptcy judges. Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States to evaluate the then-exisiting bankruptcy system and to suggest recommendations for its reform. 
Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).  In its report, the Commission envisioned that improvements in the 
appointment, tenure, and compensation of bankruptcy judges would enhance their “real and apparent 
judicial independence.” See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, at 95 (1973).  
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TABLE 1 
STRUCTURE OF DISTRICT COURTS AND BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS 
 
First-Tier 
Appellate 
Court 
Number of 
Judges 
Bankruptcy 
Expertise 
Other 
Lawfinding 
Ability 
Traditional 
Appellate 
Hierarchy 
Judicial 
Independence 
District Court Single 
judge 
Unlikely Some Weak Strong 
Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel 
Panel of 
three 
judges 
Yes Some Strong Moderate 
 
B. Hypotheses 
Insofar as BAPs exhibit more of the features associated with quality appellate 
review than do federal district courts, the discussion in Part I suggests that BAPs will 
provide a greater quality of bankruptcy appellate review than their district court 
counterparts—assuming, of course, that the question of judicial independence does not 
outweigh other factors. Many challenges stand in the way of investigating this general 
claim, chief among them the difficulty in empirically testing the “correctness” of the 
dispositions rendered by the appellate court. Knowledge of this would be crucial for 
purposes of ascertaining whether the appellate court had appropriately performed its 
appellate function—that is, identifying error in those instances when it occurred.  Making 
such a determination would necessarily involve content analysis of appellate opinions 
according to a particular metric of correctness. The difficulty in developing such a metric 
would be the inherent subjectivity infused into its design. What we may deem to be a 
“correct” decisions may be “incorrect” according to others. Accordingly, at the initial 
stage of empirical inquiry, we are not persuaded that detailed content analysis of 
appellate opinions is warranted.92 
Absent detailed content analysis of appellate opinions, how might we empirically 
proceed with our inquiry into the quality of appellate review? Although we cannot 
empirically test the “correctness” of decisions, we can empirically test the perception 
held by other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system of the correctness of those 
decisions. For those bankruptcy appeals that proceed to the second tier of review, we can 
consider whether the court of appeals deemed proper the disposition rendered by the first-
tier appellate court.  
                                                 
92 Professor Frank Cross has expressed a similar view in his empirical study of decisions rendered by 
U.S. Courts of Appeals. See FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 46-47 
(2007) (“[T]here are typically nonfrivolous legal arguments for each side in circuit court cases, so it is 
impossible to code certain cases as being legally correct (or incorrect) without the researcher second-
guessing and effectively overriding the judge. Such an approach offers an unreliable tool for evaluating 
judicial decisions because it probably reflects more about the researcher than about the judges being 
evaluated. Research requires a more objective tool for evaluating the law.”). 
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There are several ways in which the rate at which a higher court upholds a lower 
court’s disposition may shed light upon judicial perceptions of correctness of lower court 
decisions.93 First, there is a tautological sense in which what an appellate court says is, by 
definition, correct (unless, that is, the appellate court decision is itself reversed). Thus, if 
an appellate court affirms the disposition of a lower court, then the lower court’s 
disposition was correct. Second, assume that the appellate court wishes to resolve the 
legal issues “correctly” for the parties and for future courts.94 The law generally calls 
upon appellate courts to examine legal issues de novo, without deference to the reasoning 
or conclusion of the court below.95 Still, if the appellate court ultimately reaches the same 
conclusion as the court below, then it is accurate to say that, judging from the appellate 
court’s decision, the appellate court perceived the lower court’s conclusion to be 
correct.96   
Courts of appeals may not always affirm a decision because they believe the 
earlier decision was “correct,” however. Judges need not be so selfless. Indeed, there is a 
school of thought that views judges, like all people, as self-interested actors.97 Judges 
may be interested in keeping their jobs—for bankruptcy judges, this translates to 
reappointment. Insofar as district judges enjoy Article III status, they have life tenure and 
are guaranteed not to suffer any salary reductions. Still, even Article III judges may have 
dreams of higher office.98 Article III judges—and, for that matter, bankruptcy appellate 
panels—may also wish to avoid the “ignominy” of reversal by a higher court.99  
                                                 
93 But cf. Polk & Petheridge, supra note 5, at 1127-28 (noting the limits of “result-oriented statistical 
studies”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A New Window into the Behavior 
of Judges? (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-29, 2006) (using empirical data to 
argue that judges of one political party are more likely to cite opinions authored by judges of the same 
party, especially in particular “high stakes” settings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913663. 
94 See supra note 17.  
95 See, e.g., Concannon v. Imperial Cap. Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2006) (“[W]e review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code 
de novo.”); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold 
Co.), 237 B.R. 322, 326 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (conclusions of law by bankruptcy court reviewed by BAP 
de novo); see generally 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2588 (2006).  
96 It is possible that, legal standard to the contrary notwithstanding, appellate courts do not always 
reexamine legal issues de novo in practice. Perhaps, for example, courts of appeals are inclined to rely upon 
the expertise of BAPs (sub rosa, of course, since the law dictates otherwise) and thus are inclined to affirm 
BAP opinions. Or, equally, perhaps, the appellate courts might more often than not affirm district court 
opinions on the ground that district judges enjoy Article III status and thus are independent. In either case, 
it would be accurate to view an appellate court affirmance as embracing the lower court opinion as correct. 
97 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else 
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); supra note 17.  
98 See Nash, supra note 20, at 2197. Indeed, Professor Resnik has identified such careerism by 
bankruptcy judges. See Resnik, supra note 88, at 673 (observing that “[a]n increasingly well-trodden path is 
for a person to shift from magistrate or bankruptcy judge to district court judge”). A recent study of the 
bankruptcy bench, however, indicated that only 8 of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench in the 
decade preceding 2005 did so as a result of appointment to an Article III judgeship. Mabey, supra note 55, 
at 107.  
99 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 827 & n.40 and the authorities cited therein; see also Nash, 
supra note 20, at 2197-98 (discussing the desire of Article III judges to avoid impeachment, public 
chastisement, and overruling by the legislature).   
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Even if judges on BAPs and district judges have some of these motivations, 
however, that ought not to change appellate judges’ behavior in terms of upholding the 
conclusion of lower court decisions, assuming at least that the reappointment or elevation 
process does not demand political decisionmaking.100 Put another way, a judge—whether 
a bankruptcy judge serving on a BAP or a district judge—who wants to be reappointed or 
elevated has essentially the same incentive to decide cases correctly as do judges who 
simply want to decide the disputes before them correctly. As such, a court reviewing a 
first-level intermediate bankruptcy appellate decision—whether a panel of a court of 
appeals or the Supreme Court—should adopt the conclusion of the lower court if it deems 
that conclusion to be “correct.” So similarly should appellate court judges seek to affirm 
correct decisions—and reverse incorrect ones—even if their motives are not strictly to 
reach correct outcomes.  
Based upon the foregoing, we offer the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Courts of appeals more likely will uphold the dispositions rendered by 
BAPs than those rendered by district courts. 
Citation rates provide yet another basis on which to test empirically the perceived 
correctness of an appellate opinion.101 To the extent that citation of one court by another 
reflects the view of the citing court that the other court was “correct” in some way, the 
notion of correctness is, in different ways, both narrower and broader than correctness in 
the context of affirmation on direct appeal: It is narrower in that the citing court well may 
be citing a case not based upon a broad holding but rather based upon some narrow 
holding, or even dicta; it is broader in that, unlike a court that affirms a lower court’s 
disposition even though it disagrees with its reasoning, a court that cites to another 
court’s decision positively at some level agrees with some aspect of the court’s 
reasoning.102 Of course, there may be situations where a court cites another court’s 
                                                 
100 Note, however, that other motivations may explain bankruptcy judges’ behavior. See, e.g., LYNN M. 
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy judges in different districts compete for large corporate 
bankruptcy cases through the use of precedent favorable to corporations); Marcus Cole, ‘Delaware is not a 
State’: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1890-93 
(2002) (arguing that, in order to conform to dominant state culture favorable to corporations, Delaware 
bankruptcy judges compete for corporate bankruptcy filings).  
101 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that citation practices are not essentially a matter of taste but 
rather are systematic and susceptible to empirical study); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of 
Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 
1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations]; John Henry 
Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 
613 (1954); cf. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: Analysis 
of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-76 (1998) (noting that “[c]itations are at 
best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence,” and identifying potential drawbacks and limitations 
to empirical analyses of judicial citations).  
102 See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 251 & n.3 (excluding from citation study “citations 
indicating rejection of the cited case as a precedent”). Our study, too, includes only positive citations. But 
cf. Landes et al., supra note 101, at 273 (deciding “not [to] distinguish between favorable, critical, or 
distinguishing citations” insofar as “[c]ritical citations, in particular to opinions outside the citing circuit, 
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opinion simply because it perceives the other court’s opinion to be binding precedent.103 
For this reason, we consider the results of intercircuit citations and citations by courts of 
appeals to BAPs and district courts—settings where there is no issue of binding precedent 
such that citation is purely a matter of choice—to be especially informative.104 
Within this context, one can point to two broad notions as to why courts cite other 
courts’ opinions; both accord with our broad understanding of “correctness.”105 First, a 
court may cite to another court’s decision because it is truly influenced by the other 
court’s reasoning.106 If this is true, then the citing court in some sense finds the other 
court’s reasoning to be “correct.” Alternatively (or perhaps in addition), a court may cite 
to another court’s decision “not so much to explain the basis for [its] decision[] as to 
justify [that] decision[], however well or ill considered they may have been,” thus making 
the “primary function” of citations that of “legitimation.”107 Even if a court simply cites 
to another court to legitimate its own conclusions, we would say that the citing court 
perceives of the other court’s reasoning as, in some sense, “correct,” and indeed is using 
the citation to bolster the perception that its own reasoning and conclusions are “correct.”  
In light of the foregoing, and as detailed below, we proceed to test the perceived 
correctness of an appellate opinion by considering (1) the propensity of other federal 
courts within the bankruptcy judicial structure to cite the opinions issued by first-tier 
appellate courts, (2) the depth of treatment given to such opinions by federal citing courts 
(including direct quotation of such opinions),108 and (3) the immediacy with which such 
opinions garner a citing reference. Accordingly, we offer the following additional 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2A: Federal courts more likely will positively cite to BAP opinions than to 
district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 2B: Federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more frequently than 
to district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 3: Courts of appeals will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to 
district court opinions.  
                                                                                                                                                 
are also a gauge of influence since it is easier to ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for 
not following it”).  
103 See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 251 (excluding from citation study nonprecedential 
citations). 
104 See Landes & Posner, supra note 101, at 272-73; David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of 
Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 337, 341 
(1997).  
105 See Walsh, supra note 104, at 339; see also Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note 
101, at 400 (offering various theories for an increase in the rate at which the California Supreme Court 
cited to federal courts).  
106 See Walsh, supra note 104, at 339 (“[C]itations “may” indicate intercourt communication and 
influence on judicial decisionmaking.”); cf. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 651 (“The availability 
of published opinions is generally thought to be an important aspect of the appellate process because 
written opinions provide guidance to judges and litigants by explaining the reasons for the appellate 
decision.”).  
107 Walsh, supra note 104, at 339.  
108 Cf. id. at 342 (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” citations). 
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Hypothesis 4: Bankruptcy courts will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to 
district court opinions.  
Hypothesis 5: BAPs will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to district court 
opinions.  
Hypothesis 6: District courts will cite more frequently to district court opinions than to 
BAP opinions.  
Hypothesis 7: Federal courts in other circuits will cite more frequently to BAP opinions 
than to district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 8: Positive federal citing references will afford a greater depth of treatment 
to BAP opinions than to district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 9A: Positive federal citing references are more likely to directly quote BAP 
opinions than district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 9B: Positive federal citing references will directly quote BAP opinions more 
frequently than district court opinions. 
Hypothesis 10: The time within which a federal citing reference will be made to opinions 
issued on appeal by BAPs will more likely be faster than to those issued by district 
courts.  
Notably, in Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7, we hypothesize that BAP opinions will 
be cited more often than district court opinions. We suggest this on the ground that 
several factors weigh in favor of the conclusion that BAPs will resolve issues of 
bankruptcy law “correctly,” while only one factor—the question of judicial 
independence—weighs in favor of district courts.  
It seems to us highly probable, a priori, that bankruptcy judges and BAPs 
themselves are unlikely to be concerned with the fact that the bankruptcy judges who 
serve on BAPs, like themselves, do not enjoy Article III status.109 Accordingly, we have 
developed Hypotheses 4 and 5.  Hypothesis 3 is to similar effect. It seems to us that 
courts of appeals would be more impressed with the structural factors favoring BAPs 
than the lack of Article III status—particularly with respect to subject-matter expertise.110 
Note first that, to the extent that the absence of Article III status may suggest a lack of 
independence vis-à-vis the issues in the case and/or the parties, that problem is greatly 
ameliorated by the fact that the parties must have consented in order to have the BAP 
issue a decision in the first place. Second, court of appeals judges presumably do not 
                                                 
109 See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 628 (“Bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) judges 
provide specialized bankruptcy expertise that their bankruptcy colleagues . . . value as a source of 
authority.”). 
110 See id. at 678 (“Circuit judges, on average, have less specialized knowledge than bankruptcy 
judges, particularly those selected to serve on BAPs.”). 
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need the buffer of Article III status to remind them that they lie several notches above 
bankruptcy judges and BAPs on the judicial food chain.111  
The same cannot be said for district judges. The fact that district judges consider 
bankruptcy judges’ lack of Article III status to be important is amply demonstrated by the 
extent to which they lobbied against giving bankruptcy judges that status.112 Further, 
district judges lie on the same level as BAPs on the bankruptcy appellate hierarchy.113 In 
short, it seems that district judges will think of BAPs as coequals in terms of hierarchy at 
best, and at worst as subordinates. Accordingly, we think it comparatively less likely that 
district judges, as opposed to other federal judges, would look to opinions authored by 
BAPs as opposed to district judges. It is on these bases that we preliminarily offer 
Hypothesis 6. 
Given our hypotheses regarding the greater propensity of other federal courts 
within the bankruptcy judicial structure to cite to BAP opinions (with the exception of 
Hypothesis 6), we further hypothesize that the underlying motivations prompting such 
courts to engage in these citation practices will also lead them to discuss BAP opinions in 
greater detail and to cite to BAP opinions with more immediacy. We thus propose 
Hypotheses 9 and 10.  
We now turn to evidence from the findings of our study and use that evidence to 
evaluate our hypotheses empirically. 
 
 III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW: 
EVIDENCE FROM APPELLATE BANKRUPTCY OPINIONS 
This Part presents the results of our empirical study of appellate bankruptcy 
opinions issued both at the first-tier and second-tier levels of appellate review in the 
bankruptcy judicial system. We test the hypotheses discussed above in Part II.B through 
the use of quantitative methodology and look for patterns that point to a relationship 
between the type of appellate court and the manner in which others perceive the quality 
of review provided by the court. In doing so, we seek to evaluate the theoretical 
assumptions that have evolved regarding those attributes considered to improve the 
quality of appellate review. We would like to emphasize, however, that we do not purport 
to provide either a definitive or exhaustive account. We readily admit that we have 
chosen to study a narrow set of data from a snapshot in time and that, accordingly, 
inferences should not be made regarding the representativeness of such data to the 
general universe of bankruptcy appeals. Aware of these limitations, we nonetheless have 
strong convictions that a great deal of valuable information can be gleaned from the data 
and that this information will help guide future discussions. Ultimately, our goal is to 
begin a shift away from generalization and abstraction and thereby to generate a more 
                                                 
111 It is also conceivable that courts of appeals in circuits that have BAPs are somewhat favorably 
inclined to cite to those BAPs, to the extent that they consider the BAPs to be adjuncts of the courts of 
appeals. See supra note 50.  
112 See supra 37 and accompanying text.  
113 See supra Fig. 1.  
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concrete understanding of how differences in appellate structure affect the quality of 
appellate review.  
This Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A sets forth the selection criteria used to 
constitute the sample for our study, discusses the major variables that we studied and 
incorporated into our statistical models, and details the general characteristics of the 
sample. Part III.B presents descriptive statistics comparing perceptions of the quality of 
appellate review provided by BAPs with perceptions of the quality of appellate review 
provided by district courts. Part III.C presents the central findings from our regression 
models, and Part III.D interprets our results. 
If those attributes identified as improving the quality of appellate review truly did 
so, we would expect to see a positive relationship between BAP opinions and their 
perceived quality. Furthermore, we would expect this relationship to be stronger than the 
relationship, if any, between district court opinions and their perceived quality.  
In summary, we find somewhat mixed results. On the one hand, the manner in 
which courts of appeals dispose of appeals from BAPs and district courts provides some 
evidence for the claim that BAPs would be perceived to provide a better quality of review 
than the district courts. On the other hand, data on subsequent citation by federal courts to 
the opinions rendered on appeal by BAPs and district courts lend considerable support to 
the claim. Given the possible impact of selection effects on the affirmance data as 
opposed to the citation data, we consider the strongly robust results we observe in the 
citation context to be more informative. 
A. Sample Selection and Variables of Interest 
1. Sample Selection 
To constitute the sample of appellate bankruptcy opinions for this study, we 
formulated a search query in Westlaw’s FBKR-CS database, which contains reported and 
unreported case law documents (i.e., decisions and orders) relating to bankruptcy that 
were issued by various courts—including the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, 
bankruptcy appellate panels, district courts, and bankruptcy courts.114 Since we sought to 
create two separate databases, one for first-tier appellate dispositions by BAPs and 
district courts (the “first-tier database”) and one for second-tier appellate dispositions by 
courts of appeals (the “second-tier database”), we ran two, separate search queries. The 
first query consisted of the single term “11 U.S.C.,” the standard citation to title 11 of the 
United States Code (commonly referred to as the “Bankruptcy Code”), coupled with (1) a 
date restriction that limited query retrieval to decisions and orders issued during the 
three-year period beginning on October 1, 1997 and ending on September 30, 2000,115 
and (2) a field restriction that limited query retrieval to decisions and orders whose 
preliminary field contained either the term “district court” or “bankruptcy appellate 
panel,” but not “court of appeals.”116 The second query mirrored the first query with the 
                                                 
114 Reported case law documents are those released for publication in West Federal Reporters. 
115 Coverage for the FBKR-CS database begins with the year 1789.  
116 The preliminary field for case law documents (i.e., decisions or orders issued by a court) in 
Westlaw is found at the top of such documents and generally contains the name of the court that issued the 
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exception that field restriction limited query retrieval to decisions and orders whose 
preliminary field only contained the term “court of appeals.”117 The first query produced 
1,487 documents, while the second query produced 871 documents. These large numbers 
clearly presented a challenge by virtue of the time it would take to review each document. 
We sought to reduce the time demand by randomly selecting for review approximately 
one-quarter of the documents produced by each search query—specifically, 372 
documents from the first search query and 218 documents from the second search 
query.118 We then began our review of each of these documents according to the 
following procedures in order to identify those that would be selected for inclusion and 
analysis in the two databases. 
We sought to include in the databases appeals that involved the resolution of 
dispositions rendered by bankruptcy courts in core proceedings.119 We included only 
those documents that disposed of the appeal on the merits. (As most of these documents 
were opinions rather than orders, for ease of reference we will collectively refer to the 
documents as opinions for the remainder of the Article.) Opinions that solely involved 
procedural dispositions (e.g., dismissal for lack of jurisdiction) were excluded. In most 
instances, each opinion generated one observation. However, some opinions generated 
multiple observations. For example, some opinions resolved multiple appeals in separate 
and unrelated bankruptcy cases. In other instances, an opinion would resolve an appeal of 
separate orders that were entered by the bankruptcy court in distinct proceedings within 
the same case. Finally, by virtue of the identical date restriction included in both search 
queries, each opinion was issued during one of three government fiscal years: either 
1998, 1999, or 2000.120  
                                                                                                                                                 
document. In its entirety, the first search query read as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“district court” 
“bankruptcy appellate panel” % “court of appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000). 
117 In its entirety, the first search query read as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“court of appeals”) & da (aft 
9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000). 
118 Each search query produced a numbered result list in which the opinions were listed in reverse 
chronological order. For the first-tier database, the results were organized by court in reverse chronological 
order (i.e., district court opinions were listed first in reverse chronological order followed by BAP opinions 
listed in reverse chronological order). We used a random number generator to select the opinions from each 
result list that we would analyze. For each result list, we randomly generated a set of unique numbers 
falling within the range of the total documents retrieved by the search query.  
119 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.  
120 We tailored our search in this manner for two reasons. First, we wanted to facilitate comparisons of 
our data with official government data regarding bankruptcy appeals. Generally, such data track the 
government’s fiscal year, which begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th, rather than the 
calendar year.  
Second, we chose the specific time period for this study in order to capture the BAP experience at its 
apex in terms of participating circuits. BAPs did not become a fixture of the bankruptcy judicial system 
until 1996. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 amended the Judicial Code to permit, but not 
require, the establishment of BAPs on a circuit-by-circuit basis. Only the First and Ninth Circuits chose to 
do so, establishing their BAPs in 1979 and 1980, respectively. In the wake of the Marathon decision, 
however, the First Circuit concluded that continued operation of a BAP would be inappropriate until 
Congress remedied the defects in the constitutionally infirm, bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. See 
Commonwealth v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit 
reached the opposite conclusion in Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1984), holding 
that circuit court supervision of the BAP satisfied Marathon’s requirement of Article III judicial review. 
Despite the measures taken by Congress in 1984 through the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
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Pursuant to these selection procedures, our first-tier database consists of 268 
observations drawn from 264 opinions,121 four of which produced a second observation. 
Our second-tier database consists of 170 observations drawn from 165 opinions,122 five 
of which produced a second observation. Not surprisingly, for both databases, the 
majority of appeals wended their way through the district courts rather than the BAPs—
although more so for appeals in the second-tier database (approximately 81%) than the 
first-tier database (approximately 60%). The distributions of opinions by circuit in each 
database roughly approximate one another.123 
As stated before, we do not seek in our study to make claims about the 
unobserved population of bankruptcy appeals but rather confine our commentary to the 
observed sample of data we have amassed. That said, we recognize that the story we seek 
to tell may not be as compelling if selection bias accounts for the results that we present. 
Accordingly, we seek to alleviate concerns regarding two major types of potential 
selection bias stemming from litigant choices that could produce a distorted picture: (1) 
case-selection bias and (2) forum-selection bias. 
It has been theorized that cases adjudicated at the trial level represent a 
nonrandom group by virtue of litigant choices.124 For a host of reasons, litigants may 
choose only a select group of cases for which to pursue a final adjudication by a trial 
court. If tried cases substantively differ from settled cases, a study that focuses solely 
only tried cases will misrepresent the larger world of litigation since most cases settle.125 
An appeal further exacerbates the bias produced by the selection of cases for litigation 
since (1) not all adjudicated cases are appealed and (2) not all appealed cases are 
disposed of by court decision. The bankruptcy appellate structure doubly compounds the 
problem given the two levels of intermediate appellate review. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Judgeship Act to address the Marathon decision, the First Circuit Judicial Council chose not to reauthorize 
its BAP, thus leaving the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit with an operating BAP. This state of affairs 
changed with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended the Judicial Code to require the judicial 
council of each circuit to create a BAP absent a finding by the council that (1) insufficient judicial 
resources in the circuit would preclude its establishment, or (2) that establishment of a BAP would produce 
undue delay or increased cost to parties in bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. § 158. Prompted into action by this 
amendment, in 1996 the First Circuit reauthorized and the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
established BAPs. The Second Circuit BAP, however, ceased operations on July 1, 2000. 
121 Thus, our selection criteria reduced the random sample of documents relating to the first-tier 
database by approximately 18%.  
122 Similar to the first-tier database, see supra note 121, our selection criteria reduced the random 
sample of documents relating to the second-tier database by approximately 17%. 
123 See infra Appendix tbl.1.  
124 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984). 
125 According to a recent empirical study, approximately 2% of federal civil lawsuits in 2002 ended in 
trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 tbl.1 (2004). The bankruptcy analogue of a federal 
civil law suit is an adversary proceeding. See supra note 45. In 2002, approximately 5% of adversary 
proceedings terminated during or after trial. See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of 
American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915, 930 (2005). 
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If these assumptions are correct, should they be of concern in a study such as 
ours? We think not for the following reasons. First, cases settled either at the trial or at 
the appellate level are not a relevant population for purposes of our study. Our study asks 
whether the circuit court will perceive the BAP to have performed the appellate function 
better than the district court. Since circuit courts are not autonomous decision-making 
bodies and can only resolve those appeals brought before them by the litigants, the only 
cases that can and should be measured for this purpose are those cases actually appealed 
to and resolved by the circuit courts.126 Second, Professor Frank Cross’s comprehensive 
empirical study of decisionmaking by the courts of appeals has documented that litigant 
effects are not a major determinant of circuit court decisions, both generally and in 
particular types of cases (i.e., criminal decisions and labor decisions).127 We have no 
reason to believe that circuit court outcomes in bankruptcy decisions would be any 
different. Finally, case-selection bias should not impact our citation data insofar as a 
court is generally constrained to written opinions when it chooses those opinions to 
which it cites. 
We also recognize that our data potentially include a forum-selection bias in that 
attorneys in circuits that have BAPs may be more likely to prefer appeals relating to 
certain subject matters to be heard by BAPs than by district courts, or vice versa.128 Thus, 
it is possible that there are some issues that BAPs never or only rarely hear. (Assuming 
that bankruptcy cases are at some level homogenous nationwide, that will not be the case 
for district courts, since there are circuits in which district courts hear substantially all 
appeals from bankruptcy court rulings.) More generally, it is possible that BAP and 
district court dockets vary substantially. While we cannot eliminate this possibility, we 
have looked for evidence of such a bias and have found no such evidence.129 Thus, while 
                                                 
126 Even if the group of appeals resolved by the circuit courts are nonrandom such that our results 
would not hold if the circuit courts also decided those cases that were not appealed beyond the first level of 
intermediate review, such theorizing is an exercise in futility. Simply put, we cannot measure the outcome 
of circuit court decisions that do not exist. In other words, since we look to measure quality of appellate 
review that the circuit court perceives, we ought not to fret about those cases that will never see light of day 
in the circuit court.   
127 See CROSS, supra note 92, at 123-47. 
128 Since the Judicial Code mandates that, in circuits with BAPs, bankruptcy appeals will be heard by 
the BAP unless one of the parties to the appeal elects to have the district court hear the appeal, see 28 
U.S.C. § 158(c)(1), the dynamic of any potential selection bias at work in the BAP perhaps should be 
understood as the product of those subset of appeals where the forum preferences of the parties to the 
appeal have aligned. Although there could be instances where all parties prefer to have the appeal heard by 
the district court, there would also be instances where only one party had such a preference. Thus, a BAP 
docket is unique in that all of its appeals theoretically involve litigants with a consistent forum preference. 
We say “theoretically” since it is conceivable that a party with an inconsistent forum preference may have 
failed to make, in a timely fashion, the election for the district court to hear the appeal.    
129 By virtue of the fact that, for purposes of our statistical analyses, we do not differentiate between 
district courts from circuits with BAPs (BAP circuits) and those from circuits without BAPs (non-BAP 
circuits), the concern arises that any potential selection bias at work in BAP circuits could be masked by 
those observations from non-BAP circuits. Approximately 31% of the observations in the first-tier database 
and 36% of the observations in the second-tier database consisted of district court opinions from non-BAP 
circuits. See infra Appendix tbl.1. We conducted bivariate statistical analyses to ascertain whether selection 
bias existed in the BAP circuits by focusing on those circumstances in which one would expect to see such 
bias have a disproportionate effect—namely, (1) the subject matter of the appeal and (2) affirmance rates 
by the court of appeals. For neither of these circumstances do we find evidence of selection bias. 
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recognizing that such a bias may lurk at more refined levels of case-type delineation, we 
are at least confident that the size of any forum-selection bias is confined, not pernicious, 
and thus probably has not had a meaningful effect upon our data and analysis.130 
 2. Variables of Interest 
Recall that we sought to test our broad inquiry into the perceived quality of 
appellate review by focusing on (1) how two distinct appellate courts in the bankruptcy 
judicial system—the BAPs and district courts—perform their error-finding function and 
(2) how other judicial actors perceive the quality of that performance. As our hypotheses 
indicate, we concerned ourselves with an array of dependent variables that fall within one 
of two categories: (1) the disposition rendered on appeal by the court of appeals and (2) 
                                                                                                                                                 
First, we examined whether a statistically significant relationship exists in BAP circuits between the 
subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal. To do so, we classified 
observations according to whether the subject of the appeal fell into one of the four most frequently 
occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts. For the first-tier database, for all 
observations and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four most frequently occurring subjects 
were matters relating to discharge, procedure/jurisdiction, avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the 
second-tier database, for all observations and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four most 
frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge, claims, avoiding powers, and multiple 
subjects. For the first-tier database, approximately 56% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP 
circuits as well as all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring subjects. 
For the second-tier database, approximately 64% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits and 
59% of the appeals heard by all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring 
subjects. Applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we note that no statistically significant 
relationship exists in BAP circuits between the subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court 
to hear the appeal (a p-value of 0.288 for the first tier database and a p-value of 0.876 for the second-tier 
database). 
Second, for all observations in the first-tier database, we further examine whether a statistically 
significant relationship exists between the subject matter of the appeal and whether there was a subsequent 
appeal to the circuit court. Again, we classify observations according to whether the subject of the appeal 
fell into one of the four most frequently occurring subject matter categories. For those observations 
involving subsequent appeal to the circuit court, approximately 62% involved a top subject matter category. 
For those observations without circuit court review, approximately 56% involved a top subject matter 
category. Applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we note that no statistically significant 
relationship exists (p = 0.475) between the subject matter of the appeal and subsequent appeal to the circuit 
court. 
We finally note that, for both databases, courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits at a 
similar rate to the affirmance rate for all district courts combined. For the first-tier database, courts of 
appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits 62% of the time and affirm all district courts combined 
approximately 61% of the time; for the second-tier database, courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP 
circuits 68% of the time and affirm all district courts combined approximately 70% of the time. Bivariate 
analysis confirms that no statistically significant difference exists between the rate at which courts of 
appeals affirm district courts from BAP circuits and district courts from non-BAP circuits. For the first-tier 
database, a two-sided Fisher test indicates a p-value of 0.526; and for the second-tier database, a two-sided 
Fisher test indicates a p-value of 0.327.  
130 With respect to citations, if there is a forum-selection bias, then the BAPs are not deciding some 
categories of cases—and, perhaps, certain issues—that the district courts are. This logically should translate 
into an increase in citations to district court opinions as compared to BAP opinions, since other courts 
facing such issues and wishing to include citations will have no opportunity to cite to any BAP opinions. 
Yet, as we discuss below, our results on the data as they are generally show that BAP citations are favored. 
In short, if there is a selection bias, then our statistical analyses, if anything, understate the extent to which 
BAP citations are favored.  
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citations by other federal courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district 
courts. We will discuss each category and the variables associated with it in turn. 
First, we define the disposition rendered on appeal according to three ordered 
outcomes: (1) “negative” for those dispositions where the reviewing court reversed, 
remanded or vacated the disposition rendered below, (2) “hybrid” for those dispositions 
where the reviewing court affirmed in part the disposition rendered below, and 
(3) “positive” for those dispositions where the reviewing court fully affirmed the 
disposition rendered below.131 Second, in order to document citation data to the opinions 
in our databases, we relied upon KeyCite, West’s citation research service.132 We 
documented for each first-tier level opinion all positive citations made to it by any federal 
court—aside from those citations made in connection with the direct appellate history of 
the opinion—during the five-year period following the date that the opinion was issued. 
Pursuant to these criteria, approximately three-quarters (75%) of the first-tier appellate 
opinions had citing references. We further documented (1) citations by type of court, (2) 
citations by depth of treatment, (3) citations directly quoting the cited opinion, and (4) the 
immediacy with which first-tier appellate opinions were cited.133  
The major explanatory variables (i.e., independent variables) in the databases 
include (1) whether the BAP or district court heard the initial appeal, (2) whether the 
appellant was solely the debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (3) whether the appellee 
was solely the debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (4) whether the appeal arose in the 
context of a case filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, (5) whether the 
bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was filed by an individual or a business entity, 
(6) the type of dispute proceeding within which the appeal arose (i.e., an adversary 
proceeding or contested matter), and (7) the broad subject matter of the appeal. 
B. Bivariate Descriptive Statistics 
Our primary interest lies in the statistical relationship between the identity of the 
first-tier appellate court and various dependent variables: (1) the disposition rendered 
upon subsequent appeal by the court of appeals, (2) the number of federal court citations 
to the opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court, (3) the depth of treatment given to 
first-tier appellate opinions when cited by other federal courts, (4) direct quotation of the 
first-tier appellate opinion by positive citing references, and (5) the immediacy with 
                                                 
131 For the frequency of the dispositions rendered on appeal in first-tier and second-tier level opinions, 
see infra Appendix tbl.2.  
132 KeyCite organizes citing references for a case by segregating negative citing references from 
positive citing references. KeyCite further organizes negative and positive citing references according to 
the depth of treatment given by the citing reference to the cited opinion. Four categories exist for the depth 
of treatment provided by the citing reference: (1) “examined,” indicating that the citing reference contains 
an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text; (2) “discussed,” 
indicating that the citing reference contains a substantial discussion of the cited opinion, usually more than 
a paragraph but less than a printed page; (3) “cited,” indicating that the citing reference contains some 
discussion of the cited opinion, usually less than a paragraph; and (4) “mentioned,” indicating that the 
citing reference contains a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation. Finally, KeyCite 
identifies citing references that directly quote the cited opinion. 
133 For citation data for those first-tier appellate opinions with positive citing references, see infra 
Appendix tbl.3. 
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which the first-tier appellate opinion is cited. By searching for a statistically significant 
relationship between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and each of these 
dependent variables, we can look for those relationships warranting further inquiry 
through regression analysis that will confirm the existence of the relationship when 
controlling for other factors. 
Hypothesis 1 posits that courts of appeals more likely will uphold the dispositions 
rendered on appeal by BAPs than those rendered by district courts. Our data offer limited 
support for this hypothesis. Although we find that a statistically significant relationship 
exists between the first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition rendered on 
appeal for the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent 
appeal to the court of appeals,134 we do not find such a relationship for the 170 
observations in the second-tier database With respect to the former sample, the court of 
appeals fully affirmed the disposition rendered by the BAP approximately 81% of the 
time as opposed to 62% for district court dispositions.135 If no association had existed 
between the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially decided the appeal and the 
disposition rendered on subsequent appeal by the court of appeals, we would have 
expected to see BAP dispositions fully affirmed by the court of appeals approximately 
69% of the time. Our analysis confirms that there is less than a 5% probability that 
random chance alone would have yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed. For 
this limited subset of data, then, we might infer that the identity of the first-tier appellate 
court caused at least some of the observed difference in the rate at which the court of 
appeals upheld the first-tier disposition.  
On the other hand, with respect to the 170 observations in the second-tier 
database, the court of appeals fully affirmed BAP dispositions approximately 82% of the 
time as opposed to approximately 68% of the time for district court dispositions.136 We 
would have expected to see BAP dispositions in the second-tier database fully affirmed 
approximately 71% of the in the absence of a relationship between the type of first-tier 
appellate court to have initially decided the appeal and the subsequent disposition by the 
court of appeals. Our analysis reveals that there is a 9.2% probability that random chance 
                                                 
134 Of the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent appeal to the court 
of appeals, 50 were district court dispositions and 27 were BAP dispositions. As there were a total of 162 
district court and 106 BAP dispositions in the first-tier database, see infra Appendix tbl.1, approximately 
31% of the district court dispositions and 25% of the BAP dispositions involved subsequent appeal. As our 
first-tier database only includes opinions that disposed of the appeal on the merits, these figures seem to be 
consistent with empirical evidence that has estimated that up to a third of first-tier appellate dispositions 
rendered on the merits have been further appealed to the court of appeals. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra 
note 62, at 630; see also U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, STATISTICAL 
REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2005 – DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2005) (documenting that approximately 30% of 
bankruptcy appeals in the 8th Circuit in 2005 were taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals).  
135 The 81% affirmance rate for BAP dispositions in the first-tier database approximates the rate at 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed merit-based BAP dispositions—that is, 
89%—during the ten-year period beginning on July 1, 1996 and ending on June 30, 2006. See U.S. 
BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, ANNUAL REPORT OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS IN 
PARTICIPATING BAP DISTRICTS FOR THE STATISTICAL YEAR JULY 1, 2005 – JUNE 30, 2006 (INCLUDING 
DISPOSITION STATISTICS FOR APPEALS DISPOSED OF SINCE JULY 1, 1996) 8 (2005).  
136 The 82% affirmance rate for BAP dispositions in the second-tier database approximates the 
experience in the Tenth Circuit from 1996 to 2006. See supra note 135.  
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alone would have yielded the difference witnessed in the second-tier database between 
the observed and expected outcomes. Because there exists a greater than 5% probability 
that this difference is completely random, for purposes of the second-tier database, we 
cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between the type of 
first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition by the court of appeals. 
Nonetheless, this finding should be placed in proper perspective. First, our failure to 
unearth evidence of a statistically significant difference in this particular instance does 
not mean that the difference does not exist. Moreover, a 9.2% probability is still fairly 
small—enough so that we ought not to discount completely the support we find in the 
first-tier database for Hypothesis 1.137 Finally, it may be the case that we observe this 
degree of possible random difference due to the small frequency of BAP dispositions in 
the second-tier database—to wit, approximately 19% of the dispositions.138 
Hypotheses 2 through 7 generally predict that, with the exception of district 
courts, other federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more than they positively 
cite to district court opinions. For district courts, we hypothesize that they will cite more 
often to district court opinions than BAP opinions. Finally, we predict that intercircuit 
citations to BAP opinions will exceed intercircuit citations to district court opinions. As 
an initial matter, BAP opinions had a higher propensity to be positively cited by other 
federal courts than district court opinions. Approximately 91% of the BAP opinions in 
the first-tier database had been positively cited by federal courts, whereas slightly less 
than two-thirds (65%) of the district court opinions had received similar treatment. In the 
absence of a relationship between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and positive 
citation thereto by other federal courts, we would have expected to see approximately 
three-quarters (75%) of the BAP opinions positively cited. Our analysis confirms that 
there is less than a 0.01% probability that random chance alone would have yielded a 
difference as large as the one witnessed. It would thus appear that the type of first-tier 
appellate opinion has some influence on a federal court’s decision to cite that opinion. 
We can further elaborate on this relationship by looking to the number of citing 
references to the opinions according to the type of federal court making the citing 
reference. We note that 53% of the observations in the first-tier database that have 
positive citing references are district court opinions.139 Assuming a random (or at least) 
random distribution of issues and factual settings, we would expect citation rates to 
                                                 
137 For the details of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.4. 
138 See infra Appendix tbl.1 (indicating that 33 of 200 opinions in the second-tier database consist of 
BAP opinions). 
139 The first-tier database contained 202 observations in which a federal court positively cited to the 
opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court. In conducting our bivariate analyses, we exclude extreme 
outliers (i.e., those observations involving extreme values in the tails of the distribution of the positive 
citing reference data). We define an extreme outlier to be any observation with a total number of positive 
citations that falls above the third quartile of the positive citing reference data (7 citations) by more than 3 
times the interquartile range for such data (5 citations). See infra Appendix tbl.3 (describing distribution of 
positive citing references to first-tier opinions). Accordingly, we excluded any observations with more than 
22 positive citing references. Pursuant to this measure, we eliminated 2 observations from our analysis—
leaving us with a total of 200 observations for analysis. Accordingly, approximately 99% of the first-tier 
appellate opinions in our sample that were cited positively by other federal courts are included in our 
bivariate analyses of the citing reference data.  
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slightly favor district court opinions.140 Our data, however, generally show that citation 
rates favor BAP opinions. Specifically, we find strong differences between the BAP and 
district court samples that are statistically significant at both the mean and the median. 
For example, a BAP opinion that was positively cited had, on average, approximately 7 
citations by other federal courts, whereas its district court counterpart averaged 
approximately 3 citations. Furthermore, by disaggregating our citation data according to 
the type of federal court that cited the first-tier appellate opinion, we see that the BAP 
opinions in our study had a statistically significantly greater number of citing references 
by courts of appeals, BAPs, bankruptcy courts than did district court opinions. On the 
other hand, district court opinions had a statistically significantly greater number of citing 
references by other district courts than did BAP opinions. Finally, the data evidence that 
federal courts in other circuits cited more to BAP opinions than to district court opinions 
and that the difference is statistically significant. Some of these results are illustrated 
below in Figure 2.141 
FIGURE 2 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY CITING REFERENCE TYPE 
 
                                                 
140 Cf. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note 101, at 403 (arguing that the larger 
number of citations by the California Supreme Court to opinions issued by the courts of New York State 
may be due to the large case literature arising out of New York).  
141 For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
0 2 4 6 8
0 2 4 6 8
Intercircuit Federal Courts
Court of Appeals
BAP
District Court
Bankruptcy Court
All Federal Courts
Intercircuit Federal Courts
Court of Appeals
BAP
District Court
Bankruptcy Court
All Federal Courts
Type of 
Citing Reference 
Type of 
Citing Reference 
BAP Opinion
District Court Opinion
Average Number of Citations
 
37 
Additional evidence of the perceived correctness of the first-tier appellate 
opinions can be gleaned from examining the depth of treatment provided to those 
opinions by the federal courts that cited to them. Hypothesis 8 predicts that the citing 
references to BAP opinions will have afforded a greater depth of treatment than district 
court opinions. Our data generally support this hypothesis. We find that, at both the 
median and the mean, BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of 
citing references by other federal courts that cited (i.e., provided discussion of less than a 
paragraph) and discussed (i.e., provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less than 
a printed page) the opinion.142 We also find that, at the median (but not the mean), BAP 
opinions had a statistically significant higher number of citing references by other federal 
courts that mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief reference to the cited opinion, 
usually in a string citation). We do not find, however, either at the median or the mean, 
any association between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and the number of positive 
citing references that examine the opinion (i.e., contain an extended discussion of the 
cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text). Figure 3 illustrates some of these 
results.143 
FIGURE 3 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY DEPTH OF TREATMENT 
 
                                                 
142 For purposes of this analysis, we once again exclude extreme outliers according to the criteria 
discussed in supra note 139.  
143 For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Examined
Discussed
Cited
Mentioned
Examined
Discussed
Cited
Mentioned
Depth of Treatment 
Provided by Citing Reference 
Depth of Treatment 
Provided by Citing Reference 
BAP Opinion
District Court Opinion
Average Number of Citations
 
38 
We tracked the number of citing references that directly quoted the first-tier 
appellate opinion as yet another metric for evaluating the perceived correctness of the 
first-tier appellate opinions in our study. First, we find evidence to support our hypothesis 
that a greater likelihood exists that positive federal citing references will have quoted 
BAP opinions as opposed to district court opinions. Approximately 65% of the federal 
courts that positively cited BAP opinions also directly quoted those opinions, whereas 
only 38% of district court opinions with positive federal citing references were directly 
quoted. If no relationship existed between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and 
positive direct quotation thereto by other federal courts, we would have expected to see 
slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions to have been directly quoted. Our 
analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.01% probability that random chance alone 
would have yielded a difference as large as this, thus suggesting that the type of first-tier 
appellate opinion partly influences a federal court’s decision to quote the opinion directly 
when positively citing to it. Furthermore, we observe that, on average, approximately 1.5 
of the positive citing references to BAP opinions directly quote such opinions as opposed 
to only 0.58 of the positive citing references to district court opinions. Also, whereas 65% 
of the positively cited BAP opinions have at least one directly quoting citing reference, 
only 39% of the positively cited district court opinions did so. These differences are 
highly statistically significant and further support our contention that positive federal 
citing references will have directly quoted BAP opinions more frequently than district 
court opinions.144 
Finally, it strikes us that the immediacy with which a federal court cites to such an 
opinion can serve as yet another indicator of its perceived quality. Accordingly, we 
consider the period of time for which it took a first-tier appellate opinion to be positively 
cited by a federal court.145 Our data show that, for the group of positively cited first-tier 
appellate opinions, a BAP opinion would receive its first positive citing reference by 
another federal court, on average, in approximately 10 months’ time (306 days), whereas 
it took nearly twice as long—approximately 17 months’ time (530 days)—for a district 
court opinion. Moreover, slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions from this 
group received their first positive citation within approximately a 6-month period. This 
starkly contrasts with district court opinions, only nearly a quarter (24%) of which 
received their first positive citation within the same period of time. We infer from these 
highly statistically significant differences that the type of first-tier appellate opinion has 
                                                 
144 For purposes of this analyses, we excluded extreme outliers according to the criteria discussed in 
supra note 139.  For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
145 We might assume that an opinion that comprehensively and effectively addresses an unresolved or 
debated issue of law that has repeated occasion to be litigated not only will be heavily cited, but that such 
an opinion will also have the tendency to be cited more quickly. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we 
exclude the extreme outliers we identified with respect to total number of positive citing references. See 
supra note 139. We further sought to identify whether there were any extreme outliers in terms of the 
number of days it took for the first-tier appellate opinions to be cited. In this instance, we define an extreme 
outlier to be any observation with a total number of days that falls above the third quartile of the immediacy 
data (638 days) by more than 3 times the interquartile range for such data (520.5 days). On the basis of 
these parameters, there were no additional extreme outliers to be excluded. 
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some association with the time within which the opinion will garner its first positive 
citation by another federal court.146 
In summary, based on the dispositions rendered by courts of appeals on 
subsequent review of BAP and district court opinions, we find limited evidence that 
courts of appeals perceive BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review than 
district courts. On the other hand, based on citations to the opinions issued by BAPs and 
district courts, we find strong evidence that most nonreviewing federal courts perceive 
the quality of BAP opinions to be better. We now look to confirm whether these 
associations will persist and, if so, the strength of such associations when controlling for 
other potential explanatory variables. 
C. Regression Analyses 
Here, we seek to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the perceived quality 
of appellate review by constructing a series of regression models that will test whether 
the statistically significant relationships we identified in Part III.B persist when 
controlling for the independent variables discussed in Part III.A. 
1. Subsequent Disposition by Court of Appeals 
For the 77 observations in the first-tier database that involved subsequent appeal 
to the court of appeals, we use an ordinal logistic regression model to predict the 
disposition rendered by the court of appeals (with negative coded as 0, hybrid coded as 1, 
and positive coded as 2) based on the following independent variables:  
• whether the first-tier appellate court was a district court (coded 0) or a BAP 
(coded 1) (Court);  
• whether the appeal arose within the context of an adversary proceeding (coded 0) 
or contested matter (coded 1) (Dispute Type); 
• the fiscal year in which the first-tier appellate court issued its opinion (for which 
we created three dichotomous variables with the response categories 0 for those 
opinions issued outside the fiscal year in question and 1 for those opinions issued 
during the fiscal year in question) (Fiscal Year);147 
• whether the first-tier appellate court had published its disposition (Published); 
• whether the only party to appeal to the first-tier level court was the debtor 
(Appellant);  
• whether the debtor was the only party appearing as an appellee at the first-tier 
level of review (Appellee);  
• whether the appeal arose in the context of a Chapter 7 case (Chapter 7),  
                                                 
146 For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5. 
147 The opinions in the database were issued during one of three government fiscal years—1998, 1999 
or 2000. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
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• whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was that of an individual 
(coded 0) or business entity (coded 1) (Debtor Type); and 
• whether the subject of the appeal could be classified as falling into one of the four 
most frequently occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts 
for which there was subsequent appeal to the court of appeals (Subject).148  
According to the model, even when controlling for other potential explanatory variables, 
the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially determined the appeal remains a 
statistically significant predictor of the subsequent disposition rendered by the court of 
appeals.149 To further elaborate, using the actual values for all of the independent 
variables included in the model, we can calculate the predicted probability of affirmance 
by the court of appeals for each of the 77 first-tier appellate dispositions upon which the 
model is based. In Figure 4 below, we present the predicted probabilities for affirmance 
of the actual observations in our regression model through use of a histogram that 
displays the distribution of those probabilities for district court dispositions and BAP 
dispositions separately. The width of each bar represents a specific interval of predicted 
probability of affirmance, and the height of each bar represents the percentage of 
dispositions that fall within that interval. A comparison of the two distributions reveals 
some interesting figures.  
                                                 
148 For the 77 observations in the first-tier database involving subsequent appeal to the court of appeals, 
the four most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge (23%), procedure/jurisdiction 
(14%), multiple subjects (14%), and avoiding powers (10%). For the variables Published, Appellant, 
Appellee, Chapter 7, and Subject, we coded negative responses as 0 and positive responses as 1. 
149 Both the Court and Chapter 7 variables are significant predictors of the disposition rendered on 
subsequent appeal from the first-tier appellate court to the court of appeals, while the other variables have 
no association with a court of appeals’ disposition. For detailed results from the regression model, see infra 
Appendix tbl.6. 
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FIGURE 4 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR AFFIRMANCE OF 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE DISPOSITIONS BY COURTS OF APPEALS 
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First, we find for this limited subset of data that, on average, a BAP disposition 
had an 83% chance of being affirmed by the court of appeals in contrast to 61% for 
district court dispositions. Put another way, the likelihood of affirmance by the court of 
appeals increased by 36% when it reviewed BAP dispositions. Second, while 
approximately 52% of the BAP disposition had a 90% or greater predicted probability of 
affirmance, only 4% of the district court dispositions did so. Perhaps even more striking, 
no BAP disposition had less than a 50% predicted probability of affirmance whereas 
slightly more than one-quarter (28%) of district court dispositions did. These findings 
support our hypothesis that courts of appeals will more likely uphold the dispositions 
rendered by BAPs than those rendered by district courts. As this model is limited to a 
narrow subset of our data, and since our bivariate analyses in Part III.B of observations 
from the second-tier database suggested that no statistically significant relationship 
existed between the type of first-tier appellate court and the subsequent disposition 
rendered by the court of appeals, we are cautious about reading too much into these 
numbers. We would emphasize, however that, although we cannot say that we have 
statistically significant evidence in the second-tier database that the type of first-tier 
appellate court influences subsequent disposition by the court of appeals, the absence of 
such evidence does not mean that such an association does not exist. And, in fact, we 
have found evidence of such an association in the first-tier database. It would be 
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inappropriate, in our view, to interpret the lack of evidence in the second-tier database to 
negate the evidence unearthed in the first-tier database. 
2. Positive Citing References by Other Federal Courts 
To further explore (1) the decision of federal courts to cite positively to the 
opinions issued by first tier appellate courts, (2) the extent to which they do so, (3) the 
manner in which they do so, and (4) the immediacy with whey they do so, we construct a 
series of binary logistic regression models and multiple linear regression models. First, 
we examine whether the association between the identity of the first-tier appellate court 
and positive citation to its opinion persists when controlling for other factors. For all 286 
observations in the first-tier database, we use a binary logistic regression model to predict 
whether a federal court will have cited positively to the first tier appellate opinion (coding 
opinions with no positive citations as 0 and coding opinions with at least one positive 
citation as 1) based on the following independent variables: (1) Court; (2) whether the 
first-tier appellate court determined that error had occurred in the disposition rendered by 
the bankruptcy court, with “error” coded as 1 and “no error” coded as 2 (Disposition—
Narrowly Defined);150 (3) Published; (4) Appellant; (5) Appellee; (6) Chapter 7; (7) 
Debtor Type; (8) Dispute Type, (9) Subject; (10) whether the first-tier court’s disposition 
was subsequently appealed to the court of appeals (Subsequent Appeal); and (11) Fiscal 
Year. 
The model identifies the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially 
determined the appeal as a statistically significant predictor of whether the court’s 
opinion will have been positively cited by another federal court.151 Figure 5 below 
illustrates the predicted probability of positive citation to the first-tier appellate opinion 
based on the actual values for all of the independent variables included in the model. 
                                                 
150 By coding the disposition of the first-tier appellate court in this manner, this had the effect of 
collapsing the first two outcomes (i.e., “negative” and “hybrid”) in our ordinally defined version of the 
variable into the category of “error” since a partial affirmance also entails a conclusion that some error 
occurred below. 
151 For detailed results from the regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.7. 
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FIGURE 5 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR POSITIVE CITATION OF 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS 
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On average, a BAP opinion had approximately a 90.6% chance of being positively cited 
by another federal court whereas a district court had a 65.4% chance. Accordingly, the 
likelihood of positive citation to a first-tier appellate opinion by another federal court 
increased by approximately 38.5% for BAP opinions. Furthermore, approximately 80% 
of the BAP opinions, as opposed to only 7% of the district court opinions, had a 90% or 
greater predicted probability of being positively cited by another federal court. Finally, 
nearly a third (32%) of the district court opinions had less than a 50% predicted 
probability of being positively cited. In stark contrast, only 1% of BAP opinions did so. 
These data support our hypothesis that, if a BAP issued the first-tier appellate opinion, it 
will increase the chances of the opinion being positively cited by other federal courts.152 
The question arises whether this association persists when analyzing the extent to 
which other federal courts cite to first-tier appellate opinions, whether analyzing citations 
in the aggregate (i.e., total number of positive citations) or disaggregated according to the 
type of citing federal court. To answer the question, we implement a variety of regression 
models that analyze the 200 observations in the first-tier database where a federal court 
                                                 
152 The model also identifies the Published, Dispute and Subject variables as significant predictors of 
whether the first-tier appellate opinion will have been cited by other federal courts. 
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positively cited to the opinion issued by the BAP or district court.153 First, in order to 
predict the aggregate number of positive citations, we conduct a zero-truncated negative 
binomial regression analysis.154 We then proceed to analyze the number of positive 
citations by citing court type pursuant to a negative binomial regression model.155 For 
both of these models, we incorporate the same independent variables from the binary 
logistic regression analysis conducted to predict whether the first-tier appellate opinion 
would be cited. 
The models indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists between the 
type of first-tier appellate court that issued the opinion and the total number of positive 
citing references as well as positive citing references by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, district 
courts, courts of appeals, and federal courts from other circuits. With all variables held 
constant at their mean, BAP opinions were predicted to receive over a five-year period 
approximately 3.7 more positive citations than district court opinions. Focusing on the 
type of citing federal court, BAP opinions were predicted to receive approximately (1) 2 
more bankruptcy court citations, (2) 1.3 more BAP citations, (3) 0.2 more court of 
appeals citations, and (4) 0.64 more citations by federal courts from other circuits. These 
results support Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5 and 7. We also found that district court opinions 
were predicted to receive approximately 0.34 more district court citations than BAP 
opinions, thus confirming the distinction we drew in Hypothesis 6.156 Overall, the bulk of 
our evidence suggests that other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system perceived 
BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review than district courts.157 
Using the same negative binomial regression model we used to predict the extent 
to which federal courts would cite to the first-tier appellate opinions, we find limited 
results for whether the type of first-tier appellate opinion will be a statistically significant 
predictor of the depth of treatment provided to the opinion by the citing federal court 
when controlling for other factors.158 Again, when holding all other variables constant at 
                                                 
153 There were actually 202 such observations. For purposes of our regression analyses, however, we 
eliminated 2 extreme outliers, which left 200 observations to be analyzed. See supra note 139. 
154 A negative binomial regression model is appropriate here since (1) the aggregate number of positive 
citations is a count variable that is overdispersed and (2) there are no zero values for this subset of 
observations (i.e., all opinions have at least one positive citing reference). 
155 We run the regression model five times to account for the five different types of citing federal 
courts (i.e., bankruptcy court, district court, BAP, court of appeals, and federal courts from other circuits). 
We do not use a zero-truncated model for these dependent variables since some of the observations do have 
zero values. 
156 To predict the total number of positive district court citations to first-tier appellate opinions, we 
initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that included all of the independent variables included 
in the negative binomial regression model used for the other types of citations (the full model). Although 
the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor in the full model, the model as a whole was not 
statistically significant (chi-squared = 19.21, df = 12, p = 0.0836). Accordingly, using a backward-selection 
stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only included the Court, Debtor, Subject, and Fiscal Year 
variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 16.70, df = 5, p = 0.0051), and the 
Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.032). 
157 For detailed results from these regression models, see infra Appendix tbl.8. 
158 For one exception, we do not use a negative binomial regression model: In order to predict the 
number of citing references that examined the first-tier appellate opinion (i.e., an opinion that contains an 
extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text), we used a Poisson 
regression analysis since the values for this variable were not overdispersed. 
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their mean, we find that BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of 
citing references by other federal courts that (1) provided discussion of less than a 
paragraph but more than a brief reference to the cited opinion—approximately 3 more 
citing references of this type—and (2) provided discussion of more than a paragraph but 
less than a printed page of the opinion—approximately 0.39 more citing references of this 
type of this type.159 On the other hand, we found no statistically significant relationship 
between the type of first-tier appellate court that issued the opinion and the number of 
citing references that either mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief reference to the 
cited opinion, usually in a string citation) or examined the opinion (i.e., contained an 
extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of text).160  
Including the same observations and independent variables from the regression 
models we used to predict the extent of citation and depth of treatment by citing 
references, we predict through binary logistic regression the tendency of first-tier 
appellate opinions to be directly quoted by federal courts that positively cite to those 
opinions. We find that, all other things being equal, BAP opinions had a statistically 
significant greater chance of being directly quoted than district court opinions.161 Based 
on the predicted probabilities of direct quotation calculated from the actual values of the 
independent variables included in the model, BAP opinions, on average, had 
approximately a 65% chance of being directly quoted in contrast to 39% for district court 
opinions. While only 8.5% of the BAP opinions had less than a 50% chance of being 
directly quoted, four-fifths (80%) of the district court opinions had this predicted 
probability. We present the distribution of predicted probabilities for direct quotation in 
Figure 6 below. 
                                                 
159 To predict the total number of positive citations that provided discussion of more than a paragraph 
but less than a printed page of the opinion, we initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that 
included all of the independent variables included in the negative binomial regression model used for the 
other types of citations (the full model). Although the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor 
in the full model, the model as a whole was not statistically significant (chi-squared = 15.41, df = 12, p = 
0.2200). Accordingly, using a backward-selection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only 
included the Court and Subject variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 
9.67, df = 2, p = 0.0080), and the Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 
0.008). 
160 For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9. 
161 None of the other independent variables was a statistically significant predictor of direct quotation 
of the first-tier appellate opinion by its citing reference. For detailed results from the regression model, see 
infra Appendix tbl.11. 
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FIGURE 6 
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR DIRECT QUOTATION OF 
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS 
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Moreover, if we look to the extent of direct quotation of first-tier appellate 
opinions, a negative binomial regression model indicates that a statistically significant 
relationship existed between the type of first-tier appellate court to have issued the 
opinion and the extent to which other federal courts directly quoted the opinion.162 
Specifically, we find that, holding all other variables constant at their mean, a BAP 
opinion was predicted to have approximately 0.75 more citing references that directly 
quoted it than did a district court opinion.163 These findings support Hypotheses 9A and 
9B. 
Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 10, even when controlling for other 
factors. A zero-truncated negative binomial regression model indicates that the type of 
first-tier appellate court to have issued the opinion influenced the immediacy with which 
it was cited. With all variables held at their mean for positively cited opinions, the shift 
from a district court opinion to a BAP opinion was predicted to decrease the amount of 
time within which the opinion was first cited by approximately 224 days. It would seem, 
                                                 
162 The model incorporates the same independent variables and observations from the binary logistic 
regression model used to predict the tendency for direct quotation of first-tier appellate opinions. 
163 No statistically significant relationship existed between any of the other independent variables and 
the number of citations that directly quoted the first-tier appellate opinion. For detailed results from the 
regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9. 
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therefore, that BAP opinions commanded the attention of other federal courts more 
quickly than did district court opinions.164 
D. Interpretation of Results 
Our inquiry into the perceived quality of appellate review has focused on two 
types of perception: (1) the manner in which courts of appeals, upon direct review, have 
perceived BAPs and district courts to perform their error-finding function; and (2) the 
manner in which other federal courts have signaled, through citation practices, their 
perception of the quality of appellate review provided by BAPs and district courts. We 
conducted our inquiry by testing a series of hypotheses predicting that BAPs, by virtue of 
their structural features, would be perceived to provide a quality of appellate review 
superior to that of their district court counterparts. In the end, our statistical analyses 
generated considerable evidence in support of our hypotheses. We repeatedly found a 
statistically significant, positive association between BAPs and various measures for the 
perception of the quality of appellate review. However, as statistical significance does not 
necessarily translate into substantive significance, we seek to give a richer account of the 
different ways in which our results buttress our claims. 
First, we found for a limited subset of data that, even when controlling for other factors, 
the likelihood of full affirmance by the court of appeals increased from 61% for district 
courts to 83% for BAPs. Given that affirmance deference has been documented to be a 
major determinant of circuit court outcomes,165 the statistically significant difference in 
affirmance rates takes on added significance. While legal procedural requirements 
generally require a circuit court to accord deference to a lower court’s findings of fact, 
the legal standard most often applicable to a lower court’s conclusions of law—de novo 
review—calls for no such deference. If circuit courts affirm BAPs at a statistically 
significant greater rate than district courts, notwithstanding the affirmance bias created by 
legal review standards, our results suggest that the circuit courts perceive the BAP to 
perform its error-finding function better than the district court.166 
Second, we generally found statistically significant evidence that, all other things 
being equal, BAP opinions enjoyed higher numbers of positive citations by other federal 
courts; BAP opinions were cited in greater depth; and BAP opinions were cited with 
greater immediacy. We noted above that citations rates are most relevant and most 
informative in the absence of a stare decisis obligation.167 Accordingly, we find that our 
                                                 
164 For detailed results from the regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.10. 
165 See CROSS, supra note 92, at 39-68. 
166 Although we did not find a similar statistically significant relationship for the observations in our 
second-tier database, our bivariate analysis nonetheless showed a distinct difference existed in the 
affirmance rates of BAP dispositions (82%) and district court dispositions (68%)—a difference that had a 
9.2% probability of being the product of random chance alone. When one considers that a study conducted 
by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) found that courts of appeals fully affirmed the judgments of district 
courts in bankruptcy appeals approximately 73% of the time and that the study further estimated that the 
affirmance rates for BAP judgments would be similar, see McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 630, we 
conclude that our evidence, and in particular our statistically significant evidence, contravenes the prior 
understanding of outcomes in the bankruptcy appeals system. 
167 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.  
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results regarding the citation practices of courts of appeals and federal courts in other 
circuits merit particular attention.  
At first blush, one might not consider our statistically significant finding that BAP 
opinions were predicted to receive approximately 0.2 more citations by courts of appeals 
to be substantively significant. Placed in its proper context, however, this finding takes on 
new light. As an initial matter, courts of appeals were incredibly parsimonious in their 
citing of first-tier appellate opinions. Specifically, 82% of the first-tier appellate opinions 
did not receive any circuit court citations, thus making any amount of citation by the 
courts of appeals impressive. Furthermore, we estimate pursuant to our regression 
analysis that the rate of citation over a five-year period to BAP opinions by courts of 
appeals was 2.33 times greater than that for district court opinions.168 These findings 
confirm anecdotal evidence reported by the Federal Judicial Center that circuit judges 
perceive BAP opinions to be of a higher quality than district court opinions.169 Thus, 
although the size of the statistically significant effect we witness with respect to circuit 
court citations appears small, we interpret it to have substantive significance. Finally, we 
uncovered statistically significant evidence to support our hypothesis that federal courts 
in other circuits would positively cite with greater frequency to BAP opinions—
specifically, a rate predicted to be 1.45 times greater than that for district court 
opinions.170 In light of “the dearth of binding precedent [on questions of substantive 
bankruptcy law] from the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court,”171 one might interpret 
the intercircuit favoritism of BAP opinions over district court opinions as the next-best 
source of authority.  
When we consider these findings in concert with the rest of our findings on 
citation practices, we conclude that there exists strong support for the notion that, in a 
variety of ways, other judicial actors in the bankruptcy appeals process perceive BAPs to 
provide a better quality of appellate review than district courts. These conclusions, then, 
provide strong validation to commentators who have theorized about the ideal attributes 
of appellate review. To the extent that courts in fact strive to resolve cases correctly, the 
findings suggest that BAPs in fact offer higher quality appellate review than do district 
courts. That conclusion, in turn, has important ramifications for policymakers. It would 
seem desirable for policymakers to introduce more multimember appellate tribunals 
staffed by judges with particular expertise in the subject matter of the appeals that the 
tribunals will hear.172  
                                                 
168 See infra Appendix tbl.8. We are 95% certain that this rate is in the range of 1.30 to 4.21. See id. 
169 See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 678 (“There is anecdotal evidence that circuit judges 
find the BAP decisions they review better reasoned and the cases better prepared for review than decisions 
from the district courts, and that this impression is independent of the likelihood of affirmance or reversal.” 
(emphasis added)).  
170 See infra Appendix tbl.8. We are 95% certain that this rate is in the range of 1.03 to 2.03. See id. 
171 See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 62, at 628.  
172 See, e.g., id. at 634 (“[U]sers of the complex bankruptcy system probably want precedent not just 
settled, but settled right . . . . If early (and in the Ninth Circuit, not so early) impressions about the quality 
of work by the bankruptcy appellate panels hold up, the dual needs for binding authority and substantive 
correctness . . . argue for some sort of a dual or hybrid system involving bankruptcy appellate panels in 
some form.”). 
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It is important to emphasize again that those conclusions clearly result only if 
courts in fact strive to reach correct resolution of cases and issues. And that is a question 
on which our data do not, and cannot shed light. It may be the case that, partly as a result 
of theoreticians’ writings, courts favor BAPs over district courts not because they truly 
conclude that BAPs are correct more often, but rather because they simply believe 
(without truly examining) that BAPs are correct, which in turn inclines them simply to 
affirm the conclusions of BAPs. If so, the lesson for policymakers is murkier. 
CONCLUSION  
In this Article, we have shown, as a general matter, that federal courts, in different 
ways, have expressed a general preference for the quality of appellate review afforded by 
BAPs as opposed to district courts. On the hardly implausible assumption that courts in 
fact strive to resolve cases and issues correctly, this finding tends to validate 
theoreticians’ claims about the ideal attributes of appellate review, since BAPs, more so 
than district courts, tend to feature those attributes. Upon the same assumption, the 
finding also should prompt policymakers to introduce more appellate tribunals with these 
attributes—specifically multimember panels whose members enjoy an expertise in the 
types of matters likely to fill up the docket of the tribunals. 
We believe that future research in the area will offer even more insights. We 
intend to continue our exploration by refining our consideration of issues that come 
before courts. Perhaps, for example, some issues lend themselves more to solution by 
expert panels than do others. We also hope to consider the effect of having competition 
between appellate tribunals, such as exists between BAPs and district courts in the 
bankruptcy appeals context.   
                                                                                                                                                 
We emphasize that our findings do not speak to whether it is more desirable to have many such 
tribunals—as is the case with BAPs—or just one national tribunal—as is the case, for example, with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for patent appeals. That issue would seem to turn on 
how important it is to have an intermediate appellate tribunal announce legal rules with national uniformity. 
See, e.g., id. at 649 (“Structural nonuniformity may or may not detrimentally affect the functioning of the 
system and the practice of bankruptcy law. Although nonuniform interpretation of the bankruptcy laws is 
undesirable (at least beyond a certain healthy percolation), it is likely that intercircuit nonuniformity of 
structure affects few users of the system. Intracircuit nonuniformity, on the other hand, may raise costs 
somewhat for those litigants whose counsel must evaluate the likelihood of success under alternate routes 
by researching different lines of (nonbinding) authority.”).  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Sample of Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions 
Panel A: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) Opinions by Fiscal 
Year 
Fiscal Year District Court Opinions Column Percentage BAP Opinions Column Percentage 
1998 56  34.57 34  32.08 
1999 53  32.72 44  41.51 
2000 53  32.72 28  26.42 
Total 162 100.00 106 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database  
Panel B: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions by Circuit 
Circuit District 
Court 
Column 
Percentage 
BAP Column 
Percentage 
Total Column 
Percentage 
First 7 4.32 10 9.43 17 6.34
Second 32 19.75 5 4.72 37 13.81
Third 26 16.05 0 0.00 26 9.70
Fourth 9 5.56 0 0.00 9 3.36
Fifth 14 8.64 0 0.00 14 5.22
Sixth 16 9.88 11 10.38 27 10.07
Seventh 23 14.20 0 0.00 23 8.58
Eighth 2 1.23 22 20.75 24 8.96
Ninth 14 8.64 31 29.25 45 16.79
Tenth 7 4.32 27 25.47 34 12.69
Eleventh 12 7.41 0 0.00 12 4.48
District of 
Columbia 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 162 100.0 106 100.00 268 100.00
Source: First-Tier Database 
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Panel C: Court of Appeals Opinions by Fiscal Year and First-Tier Court Reviewed 
Fiscal Year Reviewing District Court  Column Percentage Reviewing BAP Column Percentage 
1998 42  30.66 13  39.39 
1999 44  32.12 9  27.27 
2000 51  37.23 11  33.33 
Total 137 100.00 33 100.00 
Source: Second-Tier Database  
Panel D: Court of Appeals Opinions by Circuit and First-Tier Appellate Court 
Reviewed 
Circuit District 
Court 
Column 
Percentage 
BAP Column 
Percentage 
Total Column 
Percentage 
First 3 2.19 3 9.09 6 3.53
Second 14 10.22 2 6.06 16 9.41
Third 7 5.11 0 0.00 7 4.12
Fourth 8 5.84 0 0.00 8 4.71
Fifth 23 16.79 0 0.00 23 13.53
Sixth 15 10.95 2 6.06 17 10.00
Seventh 16 11.68 0 0.00 16 9.41
Eighth 10 7.30 2 6.06 12 7.06
Ninth 26 18.98 23 69.70 49 28.82
Tenth 8 5.84 1 3.03 9 5.29
Eleventh 6 4.38 0 0.00 6 3.53
District of 
Columbia 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 137 100.00 33 100.00 170 100.00
Source: Second-Tier Database 
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Table 2: Frequency of Dispositions Rendered on Appeal 
Panel A: First-Tier Dispositions  
Disposition Frequency Percentage 
Negative 78 29.10 
Hybrid 22 8.21 
Positive 168 62.69 
Total 268 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database  
Panel B: Second-Tier Dispositions  
Disposition Frequency Percentage 
Negative 33 19.41 
Hybrid 17 10.00 
Positive 120 70.59 
Total 170 100.00 
Source: Second-Tier Database 
 
Table 3: Data for First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions with Positive Citing 
References 
Panel A: Frequency of Positive Citation to First-Tier Appellate Opinions 
Number of 
Citations 
Frequency Percentage 
1 45 22.28 
2 35 17.33 
3 24 11.88 
4 17  8.42 
5 18  8.91 
≥ 6 63 31.18 
Total 202 100.00 
Source: First-Tier Database 
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Panel B: Distribution of Positive Citations to First-Tier Appellate Opinions 
N 25% Median 75% Mean 
202 1 2 5 4 
Source: First-Tier Database 
 
Table 4: Court of Appeals Disposition by First-Tier Appellate Court 
Panel A: Second-Tier Database 
 Court of Appeals Disposition 
First-Tier Court Negative Hybrid Positive Total 
BAP 2
(6.06) 
4
(12.12) 
27 
(81.82) 
33
(100.00)
District Court 31
(22.63) 
13
(9.49) 
93 
(67.88) 
137
(100.00)
Total 33
(19.41) 
17
(10.00) 
120 
(70.59) 
170
(100.00)
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided Fisher test is 0.092. 
Panel B: First-Tier Database 
 Court of Appeals Disposition 
First-Tier Court Negative Hybrid Positive Total 
BAP 3
(11.11) 
2
(7.41) 
22 
(81.48) 
27
(100.00)
District Court 18
(36.00) 
1
(2.00) 
31 
(62.00) 
50
(100.00)
Total 21
(27.27) 
3
(3.90) 
53 
(68.83) 
77
(100.00)
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a two-sided Fisher test is 0.029. 
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Table 5: Citing Reference Data 
Panel A: Federal Court Positive Citing Reference by Type of First-Tier Appellate 
Opinion   
 Positive Citing Reference by Federal Court 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type No Yes Total 
BAP 10
(9.43) 
96 
(90.57) 
106
(100.00)
District Court 56
(34.57) 
106 
(65.43) 
162
(100.00)
Total 66
(24.63) 
202 
(75.37) 
268
(100.00)
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test with one degree of 
freedom is less than 0.0001. 
Panel B: Citing Reference Data by Type of Citing Court for Positively Cited First-
Tier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
Citing Court: All Federal Courts Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 6.00 7.27 94 
District Court Opinions 2.00 3.25 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 6.5107 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 6.257 (p < 0.0001)*** 
   
    
Citing Court: Court of Appeals Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.45 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.19 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 2.7414 (p = 0.0067)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.560 (p = 0.0105)* 
    
Citing Court: Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 2.01 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.15 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 9.7270 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 9.368 (p < 0.0001)*** 
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Citing Court: District Court Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.57 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 0.99 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -2.0821 (p = 0.0386)* 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -3.194 (p = 0.0014)** 
    
Citing Court: Bankruptcy Court Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 3.00 4.23 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.92 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 5.2142 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.593 (p < 0.0001)*** 
    
Citing Court: Federal Courts from Other Circuits Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.50 2.52 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.50 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 3.0581 (p = 0.0025)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 3.337 (p = 0.0008)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Panel C: Citing Reference Data by Depth of Treatment for Positively Cited First-
Tier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
Depth of Treatment: Mentioned Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 1.09 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.73 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 1.8837 (p = 0.0611)  
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.288 (p = 0.0221)* 
   
    
Depth of Treatment: Cited Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 4.50 5.22 94 
District Court Opinions 1.00 1.94 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 7.3435 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 6.941 (p < 0.0001)*** 
    
Depth of Treatment: Discussed Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.89 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.48 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 2.8311 (p = 0.0051)** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.349 (p = 0.0188)* 
    
Depth of Treatment: Examined Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 0.00 0.05 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.09 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -1.0285 (p = 0.3050) 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -0.889 (p = 0.3741) 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Panel D: Federal Court Positive Quoting References by Type of First-Tier Appellate 
Opinion 
 Positive Quoting Reference by Federal Court 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type No Yes Total 
BAP 33
(35.11) 
61 
(64.89) 
94
(100.00)
District Court 65
(61.32) 
41 
(38.68) 
106
(100.00)
Total 98
(49.00) 
102 
(51.00) 
200
(100.00)
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test with one degree of 
freedom is less than 0.0001. 
Panel E: Citing Reference Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy 
Appellate Opinions 
 Citing References 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 1.00 1.43 94 
District Court Opinions 0.00 0.58 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = 4.4839 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.473 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
Panel F: Immediacy Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy Appellate 
Opinions 
 Number of Days 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type Median Mean N 
BAP Opinions 177 306 94 
District Court Opinions 387 530 106 
t-test of difference in means: t = -3.9754 (p = 0.0001)*** 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.089 (p < 0.0001)*** 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 6: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model of Court of Appeals Disposition of 
Appeals from First-Tier Court 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Court  5.465* (1.266, 23.594) 
Published 0.601 (0.142, 2.534) 
Appellant 2.139 (0.379, 12.081) 
Appellee 1.681 (0.377, 7.493) 
Chapter 7 8.008** (1.977, 32.440) 
Debtor Type 2.545 (0.461, 14.055) 
Dispute Type 1.074 (0.249, 4.633) 
Subject 0.296 (0.071, 1.236) 
FY 1998 1.050 (0.236, 4.675) 
FY 1999 1.054 (0.240, 4.624) 
N 77  
Log likelihood -46.943  
Pseudo R² 0.174  
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. We conducted a likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds 
across response categories to verify that our model did not violate the proportional odds assumption. A 
likelihood-ratio chi-square value of 8.24 (p = 0.6050) indicated that no violation occurred. 
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Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Positive Citation by a Federal 
Court to First-Tier Appellate Opinion 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Court  3.445** (1.515, 7.836) 
Disposition—Narrowly Defined 1.459 (0.724, 2.942) 
Published 6.810*** (3.391, 13.673) 
Appellant 0.868 (0.361, 2.086) 
Appellee 1.278 (0.524, 3.118) 
Chapter 7 1.335 (0.644, 2.765) 
Debtor Type 1.278 (0.644, 2.765) 
Dispute Type 2.881* (1.148, 7.231) 
Subject 3.392** (1.379, 8.346) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.937 (0.450, 1.951) 
FY 1998 0.745 (0.336, 1.653) 
FY 1999 1.072 (0.469, 2.452) 
N 268  
Log likelihood -116.625  
Pseudo R² 0.220  
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.  
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Table 8: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing 
References to Positively-Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Type 
of Federal Court) 
Variable All Federal 
Court 
Citationsa 
Bankruptcy 
Court 
Citationsb 
District Court 
Citationsc 
BAP 
Citationsb 
Court of 
Appeals 
Citationsd 
Intercircuit
Citationsb 
Court  2.538*** 
(1.836, 3.509) 
 2.072*** 
(1.509, 2.845) 
 0.628* 
 (0.410, 0.962) 
 9.702*** 
(5.462, 17.231) 
 2.336** 
(1.297, 4.206) 
 1.447* 
(1.030, 2.031) 
Disposition  0.995 
(0.732, 1.352) 
 0.985 
(0.726, 1.337) 
   1.088  
(0.738, 1.605) 
 0.873 
(0.517, 1.473) 
 1.000 
(0.716, 1.397) 
Published  1.838** 
(1.128, 2.994) 
 1.563 
(0.968, 2.526) 
   4.276 
(0.985, 18.560) 
 3.524 
(0.820, 15.141) 
 1.552** 
(0.502) 
Appellant  1.020 
(0.685, 1.519) 
 1.023 
(0.686, 1.527) 
   0.925 
(0.573, 1.493) 
 1.381 
(0.614, 3.104) 
 4.814*** 
(2.443, 9.488) 
Appellee  1.005 
(0.681, 1.519) 
 1.096 
(0.740, 1.623) 
  0.470** 
(0.275, 0.802) 
 2.306* 
(1.101, 4.830) 
 1.055 
(0.681, 1.633) 
Chapter 7  1.395* 
(1.011, 1.924) 
 1.386* 
(1.010, 1.904) 
   1.330 
(0.873, 2.026) 
 1.629 
(0.901, 2.948) 
 1.112 
(0.783, 1.581) 
Debtor Type  1.349 
(0.893, 2.040) 
 1.279 
(0.845, 1.936) 
 1.485 
(0.953, 2.316) 
 0.678 
(0.369, 1.245) 
 2.498* 
(1.174, 5.312) 
 1.251 
(0.801, 1.953) 
Dispute 
Type 
 0.817 
(0.550, 1.212) 
 0.796 
(0.538, 1.178) 
  1.452 
(0.871, 2.418) 
 0.678 
(0.326, 1.413) 
 0.930 
(0.614, 1.408) 
Subject  1.435 
(0.971, 2.121) 
 1.160 
(0.783, 1.720) 
 1.492 
(0.976, 2.280) 
 1.870* 
(1.125, 3.107) 
 1.341 
(0.634, 2.838) 
 1.202 
(0.797, 1.814) 
Subsequent 
Appeal 
 1.092 
(0.795, 1.501) 
 1.063 
(0.777, 1.455) 
  1.169 
(0.789, 1.731) 
 0.949 
(0.536, 1.682) 
 1.127 
(0.805, 1.579) 
FY 1998  1.134 
(0.778, 1.651) 
 0.845 
(0.584, 1.223) 
1.687* 
(0.999, 2.847) 
 1.657* 
(1.018, 2.687) 
 0.700 
(0.376, 1.302) 
 0.194 
(0.606, 1.378) 
FY 1999  1.004 
(0.711, 1.418) 
 0.926 
(0.659, 1.301) 
1.324 
(0.789, 2.223) 
 1.237 
(0.799, 1.915) 
 0.447* 
(0.240, 0.832) 
 0.867 
(0.595, 1.263) 
N 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Pseudo R² 0.063 0.050 0.034 0.242 0.124 0.053 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,  
** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.  
a Zero-truncated negative binomial regression model. 
b Negative binomial regression model. 
c We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the independent variables 
in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 156. 
d Poisson regression model. 
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Table 9: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing 
References to Positively-Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Depth 
of Treatment) 
Variable Citeda Discussedb Quoteda 
Court  2.525*** 
(1.922, 3.317) 
 1.798** 
 (1.164, 2.779) 
 2.338*** 
(1.527, 3.580) 
Disposition  1.023 
(0.789, 1.325) 
  0.828 
(0.561, 1.222) 
Published  1.521 
(0.997, 2.321) 
  1.535 
(0.771, 3.056) 
Appellant  1.127 
(0.809, 1.569) 
  1.288 
(0.761, 2.179) 
Appellee  1.021 
(0.735, 1.420) 
  1.373 
(0.817, 2.307) 
Chapter 7  1.352* 
(1.027, 1.779) 
  1.302 
(0.853, 1.988) 
Debtor Type  1.305 
(0.922, 1.847) 
  1.508 
(0.881, 2.580) 
Dispute Type  0.853 
(0.608, 1.197) 
  0.913 
(0.549, 1.517) 
Subject  1.174 
(0.839, 1.643) 
 1.397 
(0.882, 2.213) 
 1.059 
(0.645, 1.741) 
Subsequent Appeal  0.915 
(0.699, 1.197) 
  0.676 
(0.438, 1.043) 
FY 1998  1.101 
(0.804, 1.506) 
  1.450 
(0.885, 2.374) 
FY 1999  0.969 
(0.725, 1.296) 
  1.366 
(0.862, 2.163) 
N 200 200 200 
Pseudo R² 0.076 0.021 0.060 
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,  
** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. We have only presented the results from those regression analyses in which the 
Court variable was a statistically significant predictor. 
a Negative binomial regression model. 
b We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the independent variables 
in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 159. 
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Table 10: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model of Number of Days 
for First Positive Federal Court Citing Reference to Positively-Cited First-Tier 
Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions 
Variable Incidence Rate Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Court 0.565*** (0.423, 0.753) 
Disposition—Narrowly Defined 0.913 (0.698, 1.194) 
Published 0.922 (0.631, 1.345) 
Appellant 1.116 (0.781, 1.595) 
Appellee 1.097 (0.761, 1.582) 
Chapter 7 0.767 (0.579, 1.016) 
Debtor Type 1.125 (0.784, 1.615) 
Dispute Type 0.836 (0.596, 1.174) 
Subject 0.670* (0.480, 0.937) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.681* (0.507, 0.914) 
FY 1998 0.860 (0.607, 1.220) 
FY 1999 0.927 (0.676, 1.272) 
N 200  
Pseudo R² 0.013  
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: Incidence rate ratios presented with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; ***p ≤ 0.001,  
** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Direct Quotation of Positively-Cited 
First-Tier Appellate Opinion by Positive Citing Federal Courts 
Variable Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
Court 2.727** (1.393, 5.339) 
Disposition—Narrowly Defined 0.563 (0.297, 1.067) 
Published 1.142 (0.455, 2.868) 
Appellant 1.079 (0.473, 2.461) 
Appellee 1.173 (0.514, 2.681) 
Chapter 7 1.083 (0.555, 2.112) 
Debtor Type 0.769 (0.339, 1.748) 
Dispute Type 0.861 (0.381, 1.946) 
Subject 1.050 (0.474, 2.328) 
Subsequent Appeal 0.702 (0.360, 1.370) 
FY 1998 1.079 (0.501, 2.323) 
FY 1999 2.007 (0.964, 4.178) 
N 200  
Log likelihood -126.033  
Pseudo R² 0.091  
Source: First-Tier Database 
Note: ***p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.  
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